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ABSTRACT 
Heng, Yan; M.S., Department of Agribusiness and Applied Economics; College of 
Agriculture, Food Systems, and Natural Resources; North Dakota State University; March 
2011. Accounting for Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Toxic Air Pollutants in Trucking 
Efficiency and Productivity. Major Professor: Dr. Siew Hoon Lim. 
Air pollution is a threat to the environment and human health. Freight trucking in 
particular is the main source of freight transportation emissions. Heavy-duty trucks emit 
large amounts of toxic air pollutants that cause serious diseases and harm public health. In 
addition, heavy-duty trucks emit great amounts of greenhouse gas (GHG), which is the 
leading cause of global warming. 
Despite increased environmental restrictions on air pollution and rising trucking 
greenhouse gas emissions in the past decades, no economic study has examined the 
potential GHG and air pollution reductions in the trucking sector and the associated private 
abatement costs to the industry. This study accounts for GHG emissions and toxic air 
pollutants in measuring and evaluating efficiency and productivity for the trucking industry 
in the 48 contiguous states. Moreover, the private costs of abatement to the industry were 
also estimated. 
When only GHG was incorporated in the production model, the results showed that 
each state could expand desirable output and reduce GHG by an average of 11 percent per 
year between 2000 and 2007. The Malmquist-Luenberger productivity indexes showed that 
omitting or ignoring GHG in trucking service production yielded biased estimates. On the 
other hand, due to increased environmental regulations, most of the toxic air pollutants 
decreased dramatically between 2002 and 2005. The analytical results showed that 
inefficiency decreased during this period. The private costs of abatement averaged $73 
111 
million per state in 2005. When GHG and six toxic air pollutants were incorporated in the 
production model, the estimated private abatement cost was $76 million per state, which 
was equivalent to 0.7 percent of the industry output in 2005. 
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CHAPTER 1. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Freight transportation is a driving force behind the U.S. economy, and the trucking 
industry is a crucial element of the freight transportation system and dominates the sector 
in terms of both volume and value. 1 From 2002 to 2007, the total truck tonnage increased 
14.2 percent to 9.0 billion tons, which represented 69 percent of all freight tonnage in the 
U.S. The shipment value increased 9.1 percent to $ 8.4 trillion worth of goods during this 
period, which represented 71 percent of the total value of all shipments of goods (Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics, 2009a). 
Since deregulation in the early 1980s, the trucking industry has shown increased 
efficiency and productivity. Deregulation reduced carriers' rates and cost, improved service 
quality, and led to a considerable increase in technical efficiency (Ying, 1990a; Ying, 
1990b ). Furthermore, the increasingly intense competition in this industry since 
deregulation pressed trucking firms to adopt new technologies, such as on-board computers 
and Internet-based communication, which have improved efficiency and productivity 
considerably for trucking firms (Hubbard, 2003; Nagarajan et al., 2000; Schulz, 2009). 
While the trucking industry has shown increased efficiency, freight transportation 
has experienced a decline in energy efficiency and produced negative environmental 
impacts. According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Environmental 
Protection Agency, 2009a), the transportation sector was responsible for 28 percent of all 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the U.S. in 2006 and 47 percent of the net increase in 
1 According to the U.S. Department of Transportation, heavy-duty vehicles are defined as vehicles of gross vehicle \Veight 
rating of above I 0,000 lbs (DOT. 2009). 
total GHG emissions between 1990 and 2006. The emissions of GHG from freight 
transportation are due mostly to fossil fuel combustion. Within the transportation sector, 
heavy-duty trucks make up only 4 percent of the on-road vehicles, but use more than 20 
percent of the fuel in the U.S. (Department of Energy, 2009). As a result, trucking sector 
alone was the fifth largest CO2 emitter in the U.S. and contributed to 27 percent of GHG 
emissions in 2005. In addition, due to the growth in freight demand and energy 
consumption, and an overall decline in energy efficiency within the industry, trucking 
GHG emissions increased by 69 percent between 1990 and 2005 (Facanha and Ang-Olson, 
2009; American Trucking Associations, 2008). 
In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court held that GHG emissions were air pollutants under 
the Clean Air Act (CAA) and should be regulated by the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA). In order to control GHG emissions from transportation, the EPA launched 
the Smart Way program which aims to reduce diesel emissions and improve fuel economy 
(EPA, 2009c ). Furthermore, some state and regional governments, such as California, 
Arizona, and New Mexico, have developed GHG regulations to reduce emissions from 
heavy-duty vehicles (California Environmental Protection Agency, 2010; Abraham, 2009). 
In addition, on May 21th, 20 I 0, President Obama signed a Presidential Memorandum to 
direct the EPA and the Department of Transportation (DOT) to create a first-ever national 
policy to increase fuel efficiency and reduce GHG emissions for medium- and heavy-duty 
trucks for model years 2014-2018. The new policy is expected to protect the environment 
and reduce dependence on foreign oil (The White House, 2010). 
Freight trucking is also a major emitter of toxic air pollutants, such as nitrogen 
oxides (NOx), particulate matter (PM) and air toxins, which post serious threats to human 
2 
health (EPA, 2009d). According to the EPA (2000a), heavy-duty vehicles accounted for 
more than 30 percent ofNOx emissions and 25 percent of PM emissions in the 
transportation sector. 
To reduce diesel emissions from heavy-duty trucks throughout the United States, 
the EPA established the Clean Diesel Truck and Bus Program and set tighter clean diesel 
standards for new diesel engines. The EPA also developed the National Clean Diesel 
Campaign (NCDC) to promote diesel emissions reduction devices to the existing diesel 
engines (EPA, 2009e). Many states, such as New York and New Hampshire, implement 
smoke opacity testing programs to identify vehicle engines that emit excess smoke and 
need to be repaired (New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services, 2008; New 
York State Department of Environmental Conservation, 2010). 
Traditional efficiency and productivity measures ignore air pollution or assume 
strong disposability of air pollution, which means that pollution can be disposed of without 
private costs. However, due to the current regulatory environment, traditional measures 
would lead to bias in evaluating performance of trucking firms, and weak disposability 
assumption, which implies that air pollutants cannot be disposed of for free, is imposed in 
this study. 
Following Chung, Fare and Grosskopf (1997), directional output distance functions 
are used in this study to measure efficiency and productivity changes in the trucking 
industry and account for air pollutants in measures for the 48 contiguous states for 2000-
2007. The objectives of this study are to evaluate each state's trucking performance and 
assess the private abatement costs to the trucking industry as a result of increased 
environmental constraints. This benchmarking study allows comparisons of states' abilities 
3 
to simultaneously reduce air pollution and increase trucking services; the abatement cost is 
measured in terms of good output foregone. This analysis identifies the gap between the 
states and their peers and enables policy makers to devise appropriate policy tools to 
improve the environment and human health via improved trucking environmental 
efficiency. 
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CHAPTER 2. TRUCKING INDUSTRY BACKGROUND 
Pre-deregulation Era 
The trucking industry underwent a long period of regulations. The federal 
government began regulating railroads to prevent unfair prices and competition in the late 
1800s. In 1935, Congress passed the Motor Carrier Act, which authorized the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC) to decide which companies could become trucking firms, 
and the ICC regulated trucking firms and drivers involved in interstate commerce. The ICC 
also granted operating permits and approved trucking routes, types of commodities carried, 
and the regions in which trucking firms served (Stratton, 2006). The primary purpose of the 
1935 Act was to protect the regulated railroads from trucking's competition and to keep the 
transportation industry stable by rate regulation, entry and operating restrictions, and 
limited competition (Wong, 2001 ). 
The Motor Carrier Act (MCA) of 1935 set many restrictions on trucking business. 
New trucking companies were required to obtain a "certificate of public convenience and 
necessity" from the ICC.2 However, incumbent trucking firms did not need the certificates. 
Consequently, new trucking firms suffered severe restrictions and barriers to entry due to 
the regulations, which in turn also restricted incumbent firms from market expansion. 
Under this situation, trucking firms incurred extra costs and delivery delays due to 
additional mileage, and they also had empty backhauls if they only had a one-way permit. 
Thus, many firms had to purchase the permits of existing carriers to obtain the rights to 
~ According to Edles (2004). the ··certificate of public convenience and necessity'" is approved based on three factors: (i) 
whether the operation serves .. a useful public purpose. responsive lo a public demand or net:d,"' (ii) whether the operation 
·'could be served as \veil by existing firms or carriers," and (iii) whether the service could be operated ·'without 
endangering or impairing the operations of existing companies." 
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transport certain commodities through certain regions in order to save costs. The restriction 
on types of commodities also prevented trucking firms from filling their hauls completely 
(Moore, 1993; Ying, 1990a). 
The Act required the rates charged by trucking firms to be "just and reasonable" 
and prohibited price discrimination (Edles, 2004 ). The ICC required trucking firms to post 
rates thirty days before they could be effective, and anyone, including the competitors, 
were allowed to protest. In 1948, Congress passed the Reed-Bulwinkle Act which 
authorized the "rate bureaus" to set rates. The rate bureaus represented a group of trucking 
firms and could agree on the uniform rates applied to all its members, and the carrier 
cartels ruined price competition (Stratton, 2006). 
Additionally, the trucking industry was more heavily unionized than other sectors 
during the regulation period, and high payments to union workers were burdens to trucking 
firms (Ying, 1990a). Moreover, due to regulatory and union imposed constraints on 
operations, unionized trucking firms were less efficient than non-union firms (McMullen 
and Lee, 1999). 
Deregulation Era 
Economists argued that regulations distorted economic behavior and competition in 
the trucking industry and caused inefficiency in operations and resource allocation. In 1980, 
Congress passed the Motor Carrier Act of I 980 to deregulate the trucking industry. The 
Act eliminated barriers to entry and rate restrictions. The requirements to obtain a 
certificate of public convenience and necessity were reduced, and this made it much easier 
for new trucking firms to receive a certificate. The MCA of 1980 restricted the authority of 
rate bureaus and allowed trucking firms to set rates individually. The Act also gave 
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trucking firms more freedom to choose routes and commodities (Moore, 1993). Winston et 
al. ( 1990) concluded that deregulation reduced shipping rates and trucking cost, improved 
firms' service quality, and led to a considerable increase in technical efficiency and 
productivity. 
Competition and Service 
As deregulation made it much easier for firms to enter or exit the trucking industry, 
the number of trucking firms increased dramatically through the decades following 
deregulation, and competition became more intense. In 2004, the number of members of 
the American Trucking Association (AT A), which is the largest trade association for the 
trucking industry, had more than doubled the number licensed by the ICC in 1978 (Moore, 
2008). The number of trucking firms in truckload sector (TL) increased from 20,000 in 
1980 to 55,000 in 1995.3 Wang Chiang and Friedlaender (1984) believed that the 
deregulated environment required a large number of small and efficient firms to serve in 
the industry. However, due to adjustment failures and mergers in this industry, the number 
of firms of the less-than-truckload (LTL) sector declined to only 273 at the end of 1987 
compared to 614 firms in 1976 (Wong, 2001). Moreover, Silverman, Nickerson and 
Freeman (1997) found that there were 2,669 large carriers in 1977 while only 1,588 firms 
were left in the ICC's large carrier population by the end of 1989. They indicated that large 
trucking firms suffered more pressure and fewer survival chances after deregulation. Just a 
few of the top 50 trucking firms that existed in 1979 are still operating (Schulz, 2009). A 
trucking industry profile study by Corsi and Infanger (2004) showed that firms that 
3 According to Winston (1998), truckload (TL) trucking provides poinHo-point service for one shipper's goods which fill 
an entire truck: less-than-truckload (LTL) trucking consolidates different shippers' goods on a truck by a network of 
terminals. 
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survived deregulation and some new entrants who adapted to the new deregulated 
environment achieved great improvements in performance and productivity gains. The 
average annual miles per truck increased from 65,700 in 1987 to 83,563 in 2002. However, 
due to intense competition, trucking companies had to pass along most efficiency gains to 
shippers in the forms of lowered rates and improved services. As a consequence, the 
overall industry suffered low profit margins and high employee turnover (Corsi and 
lnfanger, 2004). 
Labor 
Engel (1998) found that payments for labor in the trucking industry declined 
significantly due to cost cutting of trucking firms. The real average hourly salary of for-hire 
truck drivers declined by 40 percent between 1978 and 1996, while the average earnings of 
private sector workers also declined by 13 percent. Nickerson, Silverman and Freeman 
(1997) pointed out that inappropriate management of labor and capital increased carriers' 
failure rate. 
The trucking industry had more union members than other transport sectors before 
deregulation. Union members had significant bargaining power and captured a great share 
of monopoly rents under regulation. Rose (1987) found that the Teamsters Union was the 
primary beneficiary in this regulated industry. However, as rate competition, free entry, and 
non-union companies increased in the industry after deregulation, union density and 
bargaining power were reduced significantly (Hirsch, 1988). In 1973, 62 percent of for-hire 
truck drivers were unionized. Union carriers were always considered to operate more 
efficiently, but non-union carriers won business after deregulation because they had lower 
costs. Real hourly wage for union truckers fell considerably from $12.45 in 1979 to $11.15 
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in 1985, whereas the decline in nonunion earnings was less. In addition, wage differential 
between union and nonunion truck drivers were narrowing significantly. As a consequence, 
the percentage of unionized truckers declined to 30 percent by 1984, and only 23 percent of 
truckers were union members by 1996. Increased workload due to service quality 
requirements and less-attractive wages resulted in high labor turnover in this industry 
(Hirsch, 1993; Engel, 1998). 
Costs 
The estimate of savings due to deregulation was about $10 billion (in 1990 dollars) 
annually. If inventory cost saving were added, total savings amounted to be more than $60 
billion per year (Engel, 1998). Moore (1986) wrote that trucking costs decreased by 12-25 
percent while service quality did not decline after deregulation. 
Daughety and Nelson (1988) studied the change of cost and production structure in 
the trucking industry before and after deregulation using panel data from 1953 to 1982. 
They found strong similarities between the estimated cost functions for the 1950s and those 
for 1982. The only differences between the early period of regulation and the post-
regulation period were elasticities of substitution and choices of levels of inputs and 
outputs. 
Ying (1990a) estimated a translog cost function with data for 1975-1984 and found 
that total cost savings increased from less than I percent in 1981 to 23 percent in 1984. In 
his study, the result showed that after a short period of adjustment, deregulation improved 
productivity growth significantly in the trucking industry. The direct effect of deregulation 
on costs could attribute to output, input, operating characteristics and time. The results 
showed that a less valuable commodity mix and a lower percentage of L TL traffic helped 
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improve productivity. He also found that deregulation made utilizing capital and purchased 
transportation more efficient and led to a decrease in the utilization of labor and fuel, which 
caused an incentive for firms to accelerate technological progress in order to operate 
efficiently. 
In another paper, Ying (1990b) concluded that the regulatory reform led to lower 
costs in the trucking industry and increased substitution of capital and purchased 
transportation for fuel and labor for the years 1975-1984. As showed by Keeler (1989) and 
McMullen and Stanley ( 1988), Ying found that the trucking industry has tended toward 
scale economies since deregulation. Ying ( 1990b) also showed that deregulation gave 
trucking firms, particularly large firms, freedom to organize more flexibly and operate 
more efficiently, and enabled larger firms to cut costs further in the future. 
Using a profit function and cross-sectional data for years 1976 and 1984, Adrangi, 
Chow and Raffiee (1995) examined the economies of scale and productive efficiency in the 
trucking industry after deregulation. They concluded that the industry was under constant 
returns to scale (CRS) before and after 1980, and mergers and expansions did not 
substantially reduce the costs of trucking firms. These findings were in contrast with Ying 
( 1990b ), who concluded that this industry was under increasing returns to scale. Adrangi, 
Chow and Raffiee ( 1995) concluded that deregulation restored efficiency in the trucking 
industry. 
Although most transportation economists considered deregulation to have positive 
impacts on the industry and economy, Keeler (1986), using a translog cost function for 
1966-1983, found that costs increased after deregulation, but he also pointed out that it was 
possibly due to improved service quality. Boyer (1993) held that deregulation improved 
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efficiency and productivity in the trucking industry by 1987, but the improvements were 
due to factors outside the industry such as technology improvements, cost efficient 
locations, lower transaction costs for shippers, and more service types (private and for-hire 
trucking). He also believed that the benefits obtained from deregulation were due to 
increased small carriers that strived to optimize, and they made the industry competitive. 
McMullen and Lee ( 1999) applied a stochastic cost frontier approach to analyze the 
efficiency in the trucking industry from 1976 to 1987. They found an overall inefficiency 
in the industry and suggested that unionization in this industry was the major reason for 
inefficiency before and after deregulation, and higher service quality which tended to raise 
costs might have been one of the factors as well. They also pointed out that firms that 
survived deregulation were more efficient than those that exited the industry. 
Another study by Wong (200 I) examined the impact of deregulation in the trucking 
industry from 1976 to 1987, and he argued that deregulation increased costs and reduced 
productivity in the industry. He reported that this may have resulted from poor adjustments 
to deregulation or over expansion of services. He also found that deregulation led to a 
reduction in fuel cost, which may be caused by the elimination of route restriction. 
Post-deregulation Era 
Technological Improvements 
Hubbard (2003) examined how information technologies impact capacity utilization 
in the trucking industry. On-board computers helped managers monitor trucks and drivers. 
For example, the electronic vehicle management system (EVMS) provided information on 
trucks' locations, facilitated communication between dispatchers and drivers, and enabled 
dispatchers to optimize use of trucks and trailers, and allocate matching capacity and 
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demand more efficiently. The technology improved capacity utilization and productivity in 
the industry. Estimation in this study showed that advanced on-board computers increased 
capacity utilization of adopting firms by 13 percent in 1997. Hubbard concluded that 
productivity gains from new technology were quite substantial. 
The Internet has changed the operation of the trucking business. Nagarajan et al. 
(2000a; 2000b) investigated the impact of the Internet on the industry and concluded that 
Internet-based communication resulted in "both potential for greater efficiency in 
traditional transportation activities and in the creation of demand for new types of 
transportation activities" (2000b, p. I 0). They found that the Internet had both direct 
impacts on freight brokers and indirect impacts on competition environment of shippers 
and consignees in the industry. The productivity gains from the trucking industry came 
from fewer empty miles and higher cargo space usage and less idle time. Freight brokers 
provided load-matching services that offered information of available shipments and 
available cubic space of trucks, and the matching information was crucial to increase 
trailers' utilization and decrease waiting time as well as empty backhauls. Nagarajan et al. 
suggested that Internet-based intermediaries had advantages over traditional freight brokers. 
Because of using the technology, the new brokers combined load matching and competitive 
pricing, which enabled shippers to receive lower costs and truckers to reduce empty miles. 
Moreover, the new intermediaries also enabled small shippers to aggregate loads and 
obtain volume discounts. The indirect influence of the Internet on shippers was reflected by 
the new service and demand requirements for trucking firms from shippers and consignees 
since e-commerce created more intense competitions in their market environments. For 
example, manufacturing firms adopting just-in-time delivery require timely shipment of 
12 
raw materials and finished products. Nagarajan et al. (2000b) also found that the benefits 
from the use of the Internet were more likely attributable to better information for shippers 
on their shipments rather than to the lower costs of trucking services. 
A recent trucking firms' efficiency study report by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration (2008) found inefficiencies in the industry after deregulation. These include 
underutilization of equipment and assets, fuel waste, loss and theft, equipment failure and 
safety problems. The report suggested that applying wireless technologies, such as on-
board computer and communications systems, remote vehicle monitoring systems, and 
GPS, could improve efficiency within the industry. Currently, trucking industry should 
focus on improving fuel economy. For instance, a 20 percent improvement in fuel economy 
could cause a $14,000 to $25,000 cost saving per year per truck (U.S. Department of 
Energy, 2009). 
Recent Developments 
Since the current recession began in late 2007, freight demand slumped sharply, and 
even some of the best performing trucking firms started to lay off employees and reduce 
capacity in order to survive. The industry has cut 208,000 jobs between January 2007 and 
November 2009. The economic recession has slowed trucking activities. Diesel fuel price 
fluctuations also contributed to the industry slowdown. Although fuel prices have 
decreased from the peak in 2008, high and volatile fuel prices still affect financial returns. 
Many small firms spend a large portion of their total operating costs on diesel fuel, and 
high diesel fuel prices would drive some small companies out of business (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 20 I 0). 
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From 2000 to 2009, among the top JOO trucking firms, nearly 22 percent of them 
closed and 8 percent were acquired. A survey of more than I 00 TL carriers conducted in 
2009 showed most carriers considered current freight downturn as the worst one since the 
mid-l 970s, before deregulation. Since the deregulation, increasing competition, just-in-
time delivery system, Internet-based communication, new technologies and the recent 
economic recession, those survivors in the trucking industry must be more efficient and 
definitely stronger (Schulz, 2009). 
GHG Emissions and Trucking 
Greenhouse gas emissions have been a serious global problem, and policy makers 
are giving more attention to this environmental issue. California has proposed state 
regulations to reduce GHG emissions from new vehicles; New York has developed the 
State Energy Plan; seven other states have set their targets to reduce GHG; and forty-two 
states and Puerto Rico developed GHG inventories by January 2006 (!CF Consulting, 
2006). 4 Forty-four states and Puerto Rico completed inventories by March 2008. 
Inventories from states are used to develop State Climate Change Action Plans and to 
implement policies and programs to reduce GHG (EPA, 2009c). 
According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, 2009c ), the 
transportation sector is responsible for 28 percent of all GHG emissions in the U.S. in 2006 
and 47 percent of the net increase in total GHG emissions between I 990 and 2006. 
Generally, GHG includes water vapor, carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide 
(N20), ozone (03), chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulfur 
4 As of January 2006, the seven states that had set targets to reduce GHG were Conrn:cticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Vermont 
14 
hexafluoride (SF6), Transportation sources emit CO2, CH4, N20, and 
hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HFCs). The majority ofGHG in the U.S. is CO2, which 
contributes to approximately 85.4 percent of the total emission and over 95 percent of 
transportation emission (EPA, 2009c ). 
The emissions of GHG from freight transportation are due mostly to fossil fuel 
combustion. Although some technologies can reduce air pollution (e.g. CO) by achieving a 
more complete combustion of fuel, no technology is capable of reducing CO2 emissions. 
Moreover, even a more complete fuel combustion increases CO2 emissions. Thus, the 
single solution to reduce CO2 by transportation is to reduce fuel consumption. The more 
fuel efficient a vehicle is, the less fuel it uses, and the less CO2 it emits. 
Under the Clean Air Act (CAA), the EPA is required to address air pollution and set 
emission standards for air pollutants from motor vehicles. 5 However, the role of GHG as 
an air pollutant has long been debatable. In 2003, the EPA denied a petition for making 
rules to regulate GHG emissions from transportation. 6 On April 2, 2007 the U.S. Supreme 
Court issued a decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, stating that the EPA violated the CAA by 
not regulating GHG emissions. The U.S. Supreme Court held that GHG emissions were air 
pollutants under the CCA and should therefore be regulated by the EPA (The Supreme 
Court, 2007). 
The concern for GHG emissions and discussion about addressing this problem with 
policy tools have been hot-button issues. Emissions tax and tradable permit systems have 
5 Section 202(a) of the CAA holds: ''The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from time to time revise) in 
accordance with the provisions of this section, standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or 
classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to. air pollution 
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.'' 
"'According to the EPA (2003a), this petition was filed by International Center for Technology Assessment and other 
organizations. 
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been proposed. A cap-and-trade system sets the total allowable emissions quantity (cap) 
and creates permits which are equivalent to unit allowable emissions and can be traded in a 
market (trade). While the government would capture the value of emissions as tax revenue, 
regulated industries would obtain the value of emissions in the form of free distributed 
permits under a cap-and-trade system. The distinction between the two policies is that a tax 
sets the price for emissions and the quantity of emissions is determined within the regulated 
industries, while a trade permit system fixes the total quantity of emissions and leaves the 
price of emissions to the permit market (Keohane, 2009; Murray, Newell and Pizer; 2009). 
The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (ACES), which is also 
known as the Waxman-Markey climate and energy bill after its sponsors, is an energy bill 
in the I I Ith United States Congress (H.R.2454) that aims to establish comprehensive 
solutions for addressing GHG emission. The bill was passed by the House of 
Representatives on June 26, 2009 (EPA, 2009g). The bill would create new energy 
efficiency programs, require the EPA to promulgate GHG standards for new heavy duty 
vehicles and engines, and put a limit (cap) on the total emissions ofGHG nationally; the 
cap would be decreased over time to reduce total carbon emission gradually. The bill, if 
passed, would be implemented in 2012 and cover 85 percent of the overall economy. The 
goals of the cap-and-trade for total GHG emission reductions of all regulated companies 
based on their 2005 level are to cut emissions by 3 percent by 2012, 17 percent by 2020, 
42 percent by 2030, and more than 80 percent by 2050 (Pew Center in Global Climate 
Change, 2009d). 
The bill requires the regulated companies to acquire "emission permits" (also 
referred to as "carbon credits" or "pollution allowances") to emit GHG, primarily CO2• If a 
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company reduces its emissions so much that it has more permits than it needs, it can sell 
excess permits to other companies or save them for future use. On the contrary, if a 
company uses up its permit and needs more, it has to buy more or borrow its future permits 
and pay interest. If a company exceeds its permitted emission, it would be fined twice the 
fair market value of permits. The EPA estimates that a permit to emit one ton of CO2 or its 
equivalent would be worth $11 to $15 (in 2005 dollars) in 2012. This provides an incentive 
for companies to reduce GHG emissions. Non-regulated entities would also be allocated 
permits and could trade permits. Some permits would be distributed to states to establish 
State Energy and Environmental Development (SEED) Accounts to promote renewable 
energy and energy efficiency, transportation planning and transmission programs. Almost 
80 percent of emission permits would be distributed free at the beginning of the program 
and about 20 percent of permits would be auctioned off, and the percentage of auction 
would increase to about 70 percent by 2030 and beyond. The portion of revenue of permits 
auctioned would be transferred to low and moderate income households by a refundable 
tax credit or rebate (Congressional Research Service, 2009). 
The bill also establishes offset credits as an additional way for companies to comply 
with the requirement of holding emission credits to emit GHG. As an alternative of 
emission permits, regulated industries would also purchase offset credits that demonstrate 
reducing GHG emissions from non-covered sources, like decreasing CO2 emission by 
afforestation. The bill limits up to a total of 2 billion tons of offset credits to be used both 
domestically and internationally (EPA, 2009g). 
The counterpart proposal in the Senate is the Clean Energy Jobs and American 
Power Act of2009 (also as known as the Kerry-Boxer Climate Bills), which was 
17 
introduced by Senators John Kerry and Barbara Boxer on September 30, 2009. Another 
similar bill is the American Power Act introduced in May 20 I 0, and the bill is also known 
as the Kerry-Lieberman bill after its sponsors (Massachusetts Senator John Kerry's Online 
Office, 2009). 
There are a few minor differences among these three bi11s. For example, by 2020, 
the Kerry-Boxer climate bill requires a 20 percent emission reduction from the 2005 
emission level, while the Waxman-Markey climate and energy bill and the Kerry-
Lieberman bi11 require a 17 percent reduction based on the 2005 emission level. However, 
these bi1ls are consistent with each other for the transportation section (EPA, 2009f). These 
bi1ls seek to amend the Clean Air Act (CAA) to require the EPA to establish GHG 
emission standards for new heavy-duty vehicles and engines and to expand the Smart Way 
program to help American trucks to become more fuel efficient and Jess polluting vehicles. 
State and local governments are required to submit emission reduction targets and 
implementation plans to the EPA and to revise them every four years (Congressional 
Research Service, 2009). 
Programs to Control GHG Emissions from Heavy-Duty Trucks 
The American Trucking Association (ATA) provides several recommendations to 
achieve GHG reduction in the trucking industry. First, the A TA recommends regulating 
trucking speed at no more than 65 miles per hour (mph) since a truck driving at 75 mph 
consumes 27 percent more fuel than one traveling at 65 mph. Governing speed limits at 65 
mph for trucks would save 2.8 bi1lion ga1lons of diesel fuel in a decade and reduce 31.5 
million tons of CO2 emissions. Furthermore, both non-discretionary and discretionary 
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idling of highway vehicles consume nearly I. I billion gallons of diesel fuel each year. 7 The 
AT A proposes pursuing a federal solution for reducing non-discretionary idling through 
highway infrastructure improvements and for decreasing discretionary idling by offering 
incentives for new technology in order to reduce GHG emissions. Improving highway 
infrastructures and reducing congestion are also important for reducing GHG emissions. 
The estimation by the ATA reveals that the reduction of GHG emissions would be 45.2 
million tons over a decade if all congestion was eliminated in urban areas. Combinations of 
trucking companies would achieve more productivity and reduce the number of trucks 
needed in the industry, which means a smaller number of trucks with larger volumes of 
freight could reduce the fuel usage and CO2 emissions. Another way to lower emissions 
and fuel consumption is to improve fuel economy through engineering innovations, driving 
techniques, aerodynamic features, and lightweight design options. In addition, the AT A 
recommends that shippers and carriers participate in the EPA SmartWay program (ATA, 
2008b). 
The SmartWay program is an innovative program whose chief purpose is to reduce 
diesel emissions and improve fuel efficiency through innovative and cost effective 
approaches to increase the amount of distance trucks can travel per gallon of fuel. The 
program involves shippers, truckers, rail carriers, and truck stops in the trucking industry. 
Technologies verified by the SmartWay program, such as low rolling resistance tires, idle 
reduction devices and aerodynamic technologies, help reduce GHG. The SmartWay is 
projected to conserve up to 6.6 billion gallons of diesel fuel per year, which is equivalent to 
150 million barrels of oil (A TA, 2008b; EPA, 2009e). According to the EPA (201 Oa), the 
7 Non-discretionary idling is idling while stuck in congested traffic. Discretionary idling is idling when drivers idle their 
engines to provide heat or air conditioning. 
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Smart Way program partners have saved nearly 1.5 billion gallons of diesel fuel and have 
reduced 14.7 million metric tons of CO2 and its equivalent since the program launched in 
2004. 
Recent Legislative Developments 
The California Air Resources Board (CARS) in December 2008 developed the 
heavy-duty greenhouse gas regulations to reduce GHG emissions produced by heavy-duty 
vehicles through improving fuel efficiency. The regulations are projected to reduce GHG 
emissions by nearly 1 million metric tons of CO2 equivalents within the state by 2020. 
Over the first 11 years from 2010, California estimates that truckers and trucking firms will 
save approximately $8.6 billion as diesel fuel consumption is reduced by 750 million 
gallons in California and 5 billion gallons across the nation. All affected vehicles subject to 
the new regulations must use EPA Smart Way certified vehicles, or retrofit their existing 
fleet with the SmartWay program verified technologies (California Environmental 
Protection Agency, 2010). 
Southwestern states, including Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, and Colorado have 
created plans to achieve statewide GHG emission reductions from commercial heavy-duty 
vehicles between 2005 and 2007. Arizona and New Mexico recommended reducing idling 
when drivers wait, heat, cool and use electricity, and several technologies, such as fuel 
operated heaters, battery air conditioning systems, and thermal storage systems for cooling, 
have been available to meet these needs without idling the truck's large diesel engine. 
These options are estimated to reduce emissions between 2007 and 2020 by more than 11 
million metric tons of CO2 equivalents and would save fuel costs up to $23 million in New 
Mexico and up to $260 million in Arizona. Policy makers in the southwestern states also 
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suggest reducing the speed limit for commercial trucks to 60 mph. Other options for 
reducing emissions from heavy-duty trucks include incentives to retrofit or replace 
inefficient trucks and create and strengthen the "buy local" program that could reduce 
GHG emissions associated with the transportation of goods (Abraham, 2009). 
Toxic Air Emissions from the Trucking Industry 
Heavy-duty trucks not only emit large amounts of GHG emissions, but also emit 
large quantities of harmful pollutants. As diesel vehicles, heavy-duty trucks emit large 
amounts of nitrogen oxides (NOx), particulate matter (PM) and air toxins, which cause 
serious diseases like lung cancer, asthma, and other cardiac problems and jeopardize public 
health (EPA, 2009d). 
The CAA requires EPA to set national Amebient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) 
to reduce toxic pollutants, including CO, N02, PM, and S02. The EPA designates areas of a 
state as meeting or not meeting the standards, and the state must develop a general plan to 
meet and maintain the standards and a specific plan to each area designated not meeting the 
standards (nonattainment). States not meeting the standards also risk losing federal 
highway funds (EPA, 2010b; Thornton, Kagan, Gunningham, 2009). 
The EPA has adopted several emission standards to reduce diesel emissions from 
heavy-duty trucks throughout the United States. In October 1997, the EPA scheduled new 
emission standards for heavy-duty diesel truck engines for model year 2004, which were 
implemented on schedule, to reduce toxic air pollutants, like NOx and non-methane 
hydrocarbons (NMHC). In June 2000, the EPA signed the Clean Diesel Truck and Bus 
Program of 2001 and set new clean diesel standards for diesel engines to take full effect in 
2006. The program also requires refiners to produce diesel fuel with much lower sulfur 
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content. 8 This program is projected to reduce 2.6 million tons ofNOx, 115,000 tons 
NMHC and I 09,000 tons of PM by model year 2030. This is equivalent to reducing 90 
percent of particulate matter and 95 percent ofNOx, compared to year 2000 level (EPA, 
2000a). The most recent standards of emissions from heavy-duty diesel trucks were set in 
2007 and require 20 IO model year engines to reduce more than 90 percent toxic air 
pollutants from 1990 levels. 
However, more than 11 million old diesel engines, which do not meet the EPA' s 
new clean diesel standards, are still operating, and their average lifetime is 20 to 30 years. 
Due to this problem, the EPA established the National Clean Diesel Campaign (NCDC), 
which regulates diesel engines and promotes diesel emissions reduction devices. Diesel 
retrofit technology could reduce diesel emissions by decreasing up to 90 percent of 
particulate matter and 50 percent ofNOx from current diesel engines in use (EPA, 2009e). 
8 The EPA requires refiners to reduce the sulfur content of highway diesel fuel by 97 percent. 
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CHAPTER 3. REVIEW OF METHODOLOGY 
Traditional Efficiency Measures 
Modem efficiency measures began from Farrell (1957), who defined efficiency of a 
firm in terms of technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. Technical efficiency 
measures the maximum possible output level for a given input level, and allocative 
efficiency reflects the optimal input usage at given input prices and production technology. 
Using radial efficiency measurement, Farrell (1957) calculated the technical 
efficiency by the distance from the origin to a production frontier over the distance from 
the origin to the measured observation. There are two ways to gauge the efficiency of a 
firm: an input-oriented measure and an output-oriented measure. 
Following Farrell (1957), the difference between output-oriented and input-oriented 
measures can be described in one simple graph with a single input (x) and a single output 
(y) in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1. Output-Oriented and Input-Oriented Technical Efficiency Measures 
In Figure 3.1, output-oriented measure of technical efficiency for the firm operating 
at point C is defined by TE0=MD/MC. Input-oriented measure of technical efficiency at 
point C is defined by TE,=AB/AC. 
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Output-Oriented and Input-Oriented Measurements 
An output-oriented efficiency measurement is illustrated in Figure 3.2, which 
assumes a given firm produces two outputs (y1 and y2) with one input (x) under constant 
returns to scale (CRS) technology. The production possibility frontier is represented by 
MM', all points on this curve are technically efficient, and point S is an inefficient firm. 
AA' represents the isorevenue, and its slope reflects the output price ratio. 
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Figure 3.2. Output-Oriented Efficiencies 
A' 
According to Farrell (1957), output-oriented technical efficiency (TE) is measured 
by TE0=0Q/OS. The distance SQ reflects the amount of the outputs that could be increased 
without additional input. Allocative efficiency (AE) is defined by AE=OP/OQ. The 
distance PQ reflects the amount of output revenue that could be expanded if the firm is 
allocatively efficient. Both values of TE and AE are greater than or equal to one. 
Alternatively, input-oriented efficiency measures the input that could be 
proportionally decreased at a given output level. Assuming two inputs (x 1, x2) are used to 
produce output (y) under CRS, the details of an input-orientated measurement are 
illustrated in Figure 3.3. Point S represents the quantities of the two inputs used by a given 
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firm. The curve MM' is the isoquant. AA' represents the isocost, and its slope reflects the 
input price ratio. 
Technical efficiency of a given firm at S is measured by TE=OQ/OS. The distance 
QS reflects the amount of inputs that could be shrunk proportionally without reducing 
output, and if the ratio value equals to one, the firm is technically efficient. Allocative 
efficiency is defined by AE=OP/OQ. The distance of PQ reflects the production costs that 
could be reduced if a firm is both technically and allocatively efficient. Both values of TE 
and AE are between zero and one. 
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Figure 3.3. Input-Oriented Efficiencies 
Scale Efficiency 
Another important concept related to efficiency is scale efficiency. !fa firm's 
production exhibits variable returns to scale (YRS) technology, it is possible for this firm to 
be both technically and allocatively efficient, but not scale efficient. Scale inefficiency 
indicates that the firm may improve its efficiency by changing its operating scale, and the 
inefficiency is the amount of productivity that can be increased if a firm is operating at the 
most productive scale size. The point of scale efficiency is where technical efficiency under 
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CRS is equal to that under YRS. In Figure 3.4, a simple case with a single input (x) and a 
single output (y) is used to illustrate scale efficiency. The firms at points A, B, and C are all 
on the production possibility frontier NN' and have achieved technical efficiency, but their 
productivities, which can be represented by the slope of a ray from the origin through the 
firm point, are different. OM is a CRS frontier, and NN' is a YRS frontier. The most 
productive scale is represented by point B, where a firm cannot increase its production by 
changing its scale. 
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Figure 3.4. Scale Efficiency 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
D 
C 
The firm at point D is neither technically nor allocatively efficient. The technical 
efficiency of firm D under YRS is obtained by TEvRs= GE/GD. The technical efficiency of 
firm D under CRS is defined as TECRs= GF/GD. Thus, the ratio of these two measures of 
technical efficiency is the scale efficiency score, which can be calculated by SE = TECRs 
/TEvRs = GF/GE 
Distance Function 
Coelli et al. (2005) maintained that the Farrell's input- and output-oriented 
technical efficiency measurements are equivalent to input and output distance functions 
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developed by Shephard (1953). Distance functions have been widely used to measure 
productivity and efficiency. The output distance function measures the amount of outputs 
to be increased to reach the production frontier for a firm, and input distance function 
reflects the minimal input vector for a given output level. The Shephard's output distance 
function can be defined as: 
d0 (x,y) = min{8: (~) EP(x)}, (3.1) 
where P(x) represents the output set of output vector y which can be produced by the input 
vector x. 
Output distance function d0(x, y) has several properties: zero inputs generate zero 
outputs; y is non-decreasing and convex; xis non-increasing and quasi-convex; y is 
homogenous of degree one; d0(x, y) S: I, and it equals to one when the outputs are on the 
production possibility frontier. Figure 3.5 shows the details using an example including two 
outputs (y1, y2) at a given input vector x. The production possibility set, P(x), is represented 
by the area bounded by production possibility frontier AA'. 
P(x) 
0 
Figure 3.5. Output Distance Function 
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A given technically inefficient firm is reflected by point N under the production 
possibility frontier. The output distance function value of firm N can be calculated by 8= 
ON/OM. Point M, which is on the production possibility frontier, has a distance function 
value equal to I. 
Farrell's output oriented technical efficiency measure can be represented by 
Shephard's output distance function as: Fo(x, y) = max {qi: <pyEP(x)}. The duality shows 
that Fo(x, y) = l/d0(x, y). A firm is technically efficient when the value of output distance 
function is equal to I. 
Alternatively, the input distance function is defined by Shephard as: 
d/x,y) = max {p: (~) EL(y)}, (3.2) 
where the input set L(y) represents all the input vectors x used to produce y. 
Input distance function di(x, y) has a few properties: y is non-increasing and quasi-
concave; xis non-decreasing and concave; xis homogenous of degree one; l:S d;(x, y) < co, 
and it equals one when the inputs are on the isoquant. 
In Figure 3.6, two inputs (x 1, x2) are used to produce an output vector (y). The 
isoquant is represented by curve AA'. Point M reflects a given technically inefficient firm. 
The input distance function of firm M can be calculated by p= OM/ON. Point N is on the 
frontier of the isoquant, and its value of distance function equals I. Under CRS, the output 
distance function is the reciprocal of the input distance function for all x and y. 
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Figure 3 .6. The Input Distance Function 
Farrell's input-oriented measure of technical efficiency can be expressed by the 
Shephard's input distance function as: Fi (x, y) = min {8, Bx E L(y) }. The duality shows 
that F,(x, y) = 1/ d;(x, y). Technical efficiency is achieved when the distance function is 
equal to I and leads to a technical efficiency score of I. Also, following Fare, Grosskopf 
and Roos (1998), the scale efficiency can be defined by distance function as: 
d/x,y[VRS) 
SE=-----
di(x,y[CRS) 
Data Envelopment Analysis 
(3.3) 
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a piecewise linear programming approach to 
construct a non-parametric frontier, and efficiency of units could be measured based on the 
frontier. 
Suppose there are M outputs (y) and N inputs (x) for each ofi=(l, ... ,I) firms, 
consider an efficiency measure by a ratio µ'y;/v'x;_ where µ is an Mx I vector of output 
weights and vis an Nx 1 vector of input weights. The optimal weights µ and v can be 
obtained by solving the following mathematical programming problem: 
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s. t. µ'y;/v'x; s 1, 
µ,v20. (3.4) 
The programming problem (3.4) maximizes the efficiency of firm i, subject to the 
constraints that all efficiency measures must be less than or equal to one. One problem of 
the ratio form is that it has an infinite number of solutions, that is, if(µ*, v*) is a solution, 
then (aµ*, av*) is another solution. One way to avoid this is to impose the constraint v'x, 
= 1, which allows the model to be rewritten as: 
Maxµ,v (u'y;), 
s. t. v'x; = 1, 
' ' 0 u Yi - VX; s , 
U, V 2 0 . (3.5) 
The form of the DEA model (3 .5) is called the multiplier form. The duality of (3 .5) 
can be derived in an equivalent envelopment form of this linear programming problem: 
Max8,A 8 
s. t.-y; + YA 2 0, 
A.20, (3.6) 
where 8 is a scalar, which presents the firm's efficiency score, and O< es I; 1,, is a Jx I 
vector of constants; Y is an Mx] output matrix and Xis an Nxl input matrix for all I firms. 
The linear programming problem (3.6) is an input-oriented DEA model. 
Under CRS technology, all firms are operating at the optimal scale; otherwise, it is 
necessary to take YRS into consideration. The DEA model with CRS production 
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technology can be adjusted to account for YRS production technology by imposing the 
constraint Il'A =I and rewriting (3.6) as: 
Mine,,- 0 
s. t. -y; + YA 2 0,, 
0x; - XA 2 0, 
I1'A = 1 
A 2 0, (3.7) 
where 11 is an Ix I vector of ones. This approach provides a tighter envelopment of the data 
than does the CRS model. 
Alternatively, the output-oriented DEA models are very similar to the input-
oriented DEA models. Consider the output-oriented DEA model under YRS as following: 
Max'I',' cp, 
s. t. -cpy; + YA 2 0, 
X; - XA2 0, 
I1'A = 1, 
A 2 0, 
where cp is a scalar, and Is; cp<=. Under CRS, 0 = 1/cp. 
(3.8) 
The DEA models discussed so far are based on the assumption that inputs and 
outputs are strongly disposable. This implies that firms can discard unwanted inputs or 
outputs without costs. If this is not true, some segments of the piece-wise linear frontier 
constructed by DEA would have a positive slope, as illustrated in Figure 3. 7. The isoquant 
frontier MM' reflects the assumption of strong disposability and the curve AM' assumes 
weak disposability ofx 1• The segment AP bends back and positive slopes. 
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Similarly, the production possibility frontier NN' assumes strong disposability 
while curve BN' assumes weak disposability of y2 in Figure 3.8. The latter has a positively 
sloped segment BQ. 
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Figure 3.7. Input Disposability Figure 3.8. Output Disposability 
Traditional Productivity Measures 
Productivity represents a firm's performance and can be measured by a ratio of 
outputs produced over inputs consumed. A simple measurement for productivity is 
profitability ratios, which are defined as revenue over input cost. For example, one firm 
produces single output y with price p produced by single input x with price w, the 
profitability ratio is given by rr= PY. 
wx 
However, the measure of the productivity in the case involving multiple inputs and 
outputs is much more complicated. It is not appropriate to sum up all the outputs and inputs 
to form an output quantity and input quantity. To solve this problem, disaggregated data on 
the quantity of outputs and inputs are usually weighted by output and input prices to form 
output and input quantity indexes. Thus, multiple inputs and outputs have to be adjusted by 
input and output price indexes instead of being adjusted by a simple price ratio. 
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For multiple outputs and inputs across firms or over time, the total factor 
productivity (TFP) is commonly used, which can be defined as a ratio of aggregate outputs 
to aggregate inputs. The change in TFP is the change of total outputs relative to the change 
of total inputs: 
(3.9) 
where the superscripts t and s represent the associated quantities of output and input in 
period t and period s, respectively. 
Laspeyres and Paasche Index Numbers 
Denote PmJ and Ymj as the price and quantity of them-th output (m=l,2, ... ,M), Wnj 
and XnJ as the price and quantity of the n-th input (n=J,2, ... ,N), inj-th period (i=s, t). 
Period s represents the base period, period t represents the current period. 
The Laspeyres quantity index employs previous period prices as the base, and it is 
represented by the ratio of aggregate values of base period prices at current and base period 
quantities: 
I~ PinYiri Laspeyres output quantity index = Q50tL = ----It;\ PinYin . 
INwsxt 
Laspeyres input quantity index = Qr[ = I: : : 
n WnXn 
(3.10) 
(3.11) 
The Passche index is an alternative to Laspeyres index, and it uses the current 
period as the base. Passche quantity index employs current period prices as the base and is 
measured by the ratio of aggregate values of current-period prices at current- and base-
period quantities: 
I~ PiriYiri Passche output quantity index = Qi)"p = 
It;\ PiriYin . (3.12) 
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Passche input quantity index = 
"N w' x' 
Qst _ L..n n n IP - '°Mwtxs 
.l..in n n 
(3.13) 
The Laspeyres and Passche indexes are widely applied in practice since they are 
easy to calculate. But a clear drawback of the two indexes is that one must arbitrarily 
choose between two time periods as the base. 
Fisher Index Nnmber 
The Fisher index is defined by the geometric mean of the Laspeyres and Passche 
indexes (Fisher, 1922). The Fisher quantity index is defined as: 
Fisher quantity index = Qft = Qi' x Qtt. (3.14) 
Diewert (1992) recommends using the Fisher index since it satisfies many more 
tests (axioms) than its competitors. Some basic axioms include positivity, which implies 
that the index should be positive; proportionality, which requires that if all quantities 
increase or decrease by the same proportion, the index should increase or decrease by the 
same proportion; time-reversal test, which implies that for periods s and t, the index going 
from period s to period t is the inverse of the index going from period t to period s; and 
factor-reversal test, which indicates that if interchange the factors (price and quantity) in a 
price index formula to obtain a quantity index of exactly the same functional form, the 
product of the indexes should equal the ratio of values of the aggregate. 
The Fisher index satisfies all the four tests above, while both Laspeyres and 
Paasche indexes fail the time-reversal test, and the Tiirnqvist index fails factor-reversal test. 
The Fisher is also known as the ideal index. 9 
9 The Fisher ideal index satisfies the all tests except circularity test, which requires an index should be independent of a 
choice of a third period. 
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The Tiirnqvist Index 
The Tornqvist index is another popular index that has been applied in many total 
factor productivity studies. The Tornqvist quantity index is the weighted geometric average 
of a relative quantity ratio, with the weight of simple average of the value shares in periods 
sand t. The Tornqvist output quantity index is given by: 
M wfu+w}n 
Tornqvist output quantity index = Qb\ = fl [y~] 2 , 
m=l Ym 
(3.15) 
where Wms is the value share of m-th output in period s, and w~ = IMpfny;n , , while Wmt 
m=l PmYm 
t t 
is the value share of m-th output in period t, and it is defined as Win = LMPmY:;' , . 
m=l PmYm 
Similarly, the Tornqvist input quantity index is given by: 
N w~+w~ 
Tornqvist iutput quantity index = Q~T = fl [ :~] 2 
n=l 
(3.16) 
' ' where w05 is the value share of n-th input in period s, and w~ = IN wnx~ , , while w0 , is the 
n=l WnXn 
t t 
value share of n-th input in period t, and it is defined as w~ = IN wnx~ , . 
n=l WnXn 
The log-change form of the Tornqvist quantity index is generally applied since it is 
convenient for computation. The logarithmic of the Tornqvist output quantity index is 
defined as: 
lnQ~iT = f ( w~ ; Win) [lnyin - lny~]. 
m:::1 
(3.17) 
Similarly, the logarithmic ofTornqvist input quantity index is defined as: 
IN (ws +w') lnQ5 ' - n n [lnx' - lnx 5 ] IT - z n n · 
n=l 
(3.18) 
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Diewert (1992) showed that the Tornqvist index also provides proper 
approximations to the actual quantities of output and input as the Fisher index, and both of 
the two indexes yield very close results in defining the TFP index. 10 
Malmquist Index 
Malmquist index was proposed by Sten Malmquist, and was applied popularly after 
introduced by Caves, Christensen and Diewert ( 1982b ). Malmquist index accommodates 
multiple outputs and inputs, and it does not require price information. It is preferred to the 
Fisher and Tornqvist indexes when price information is not available. 
The output-oriented Malmquist productivity index in period s under constant 
returns to scale technology can be calculated using the output distance functions based on 
period s reference technology as: 
Ms( s t s t) _ d~(yl,x') 
O y 'y ' X 'X - 'ds ( s s) 
0 y ,x 
(3.19) 
where d~(y',x') is a mixed-period distance function and thus may yield a value greater 
than, equal to, or less than one. 
Similarly, the output-oriented Malmquist productivity index in period t under 
constant returns to scale technology as: 
Mt ( s , s t) _ d~(yl,x') oY,Y,X,X -d'( )' 
o ys, xs 
(3.20) 
As the output-oriented Malmquist productivity index can use either period-s 
technology or period-! technology as the benchmark technology, one could define the 
10 The TOrnqvist formula satisfies 12 of Diewcrt's ( 1992) desirable tests but fails the circularity test and time•revcrsal test. 
Diewut ( 1978) showed that only small differences exist between the Fisher and TOrnqvist indexes. 
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Malmquist TFP index as the geometric mean of the two indexes based on period s and 
period t, which is given by: 
M0 (y5,y1,X5,x1) = [Mg(y5,y',x5,x1) x M~(y5,y1,x5,x1)] 05 
= [dg(y', x') x d~(y', x')] 05 
dg(y•, x•) d1(y•, x•) 
If the value of the Malmquist measure is greater than one, it indicates productivity 
improvement, while a value less than one indicates a decrease in productivity. 
(3.21) 
According to Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982b), under the assumptions of 
CRS technology and technical and allocative efficiency of the firm in both period s and 
period t, the Malmquist TFP index can be approximately computed as a ratio of a Tomqvist 
output index over a Tomqvist input index, which is given by: 
M0 (y5,y',x•,x1) = [Mg(y5,y1,x5,x1) x M~(y5,y1,x5,x1)] 0 ·5 
Tornqvist output index 
Tornqvist input index · 
(3.22) 
The Malmquist index which is defined as the geometric mean of distance functions 
based on current- and base- period technologies can be rearranged and defined in terms of 
the product of a technical change index and a technical efficiency change index under CRS. 
The output-oriented Malmquist quantity index can be rewritten as: 
stst o, 0 1 o, d' (y' x') [d5 (y1 x 1) d5 (y5 x5 )] 05 
Mo(Y 'Y 'x 'x) = dg(y 5 , x•) d~(y', x') x d1(y•, x•) (3.23) 
ct' (y' x') [ct' (y' x') ct' (y' x')]0.5 
where the term ; ; , is technical efficiency change and the term ct; ( ,' ') x ~( ; ') d 0 (y ,x ) 0 y ,x d0 y ,x 
represents technical change. 
Technical efficiency change (EFFCH) measures the change in technical efficiency 
between the two periods, while the technical change (TECH) measures the geometric mean 
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of the shifts in the production possibility frontier. This decomposition is illustrated in 
Figure 3.9 with a single input (x) and one single output (y) under CRS technology. 
\"· 
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y~ 
Y1 
0 
Period t 
B Periods 
ILL.~...:.:----'-----------
X 
Figure 3.9. Technical Efficiency Change and Technical Change 
A firm operates at point A in period s and at point B in period t. In each period, the 
firm is technically inefficient since point A and point B are both under the frontier which 
indicates technical efficiency for that period. Hence, the ratio Y•/Ys represents the technical 
Yi/Yz 
efficiency change for the firm between two periods. The technical change can be 
represented by [Y•l
1
Y, X Yil
1
Y'] 05 
Y4 Ys Y1 Y3 
If suitable panel data are available, the distance functions in equation (3 .22) can be 
calculated by DEA-like linear programs. Following Fare et al. (1994), for the i-th firm, four 
distance functions are calculated using Farrell output-oriented technical efficiencies under 
CRS technology in their TFP measurements: 
[d~(y',x')J- 1 = maxcp.A• <p 
s. t. - cpy;' + yt ').. 2'. 0, 
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and 
[d~(y•,x•)J- 1 = maxcp),, cp 
s. t. - cpyf + ys A ? 0, 
A?O, 
[d~(y•, x•)J-1 = maxcp)., cp 
s. t. - cpyf + Y' A? 0, 
A?O, 
[d~(y', x')J-1 = maxcp)., cp 
s. t. - cpyf + ys A? 0, 
X' - X" > 0 I I\, - ' 
A?O. 
(3.24) 
(3.25) 
(3.26) 
(3.27) 
As equations (3.26) and (3.27) measuring mix-period distance function, the cp value 
may yield greater than, equal to, or less than one. 
Accounting for Bad Outputs in Efficiency and Productivity Measures 
Caves, Christensen and Diewert ( 1982b) derived multilateral superlative indexes for 
comparisons of outputs, inputs, and productivity across firms. Pittman ( 1983) pointed out 
that if undesirable outputs are produced with desirable output, desirable and undesirable 
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outputs should be treated asymmetrically. When evaluating the performance of firms or 
industries, it makes sense to credit them for increased production of goods and reduction of 
undesirable outputs, such as air and water pollution. However, traditional productivity 
measures focus on desirable outputs but ignore undesirable outputs because bad outputs, 
such as pollution, usually do not have marketable prices. To address this problem, Pittman 
(1983) provided an enhanced multi-factor productivity index and constructed shadow 
prices for undesirable outputs from profit maximizing with exogenous constraints on the 
amount of undesirable outputs. However, Pittman (1983) noted that assigning shadow 
prices to undesirable output was difficult because the estimations of shadow prices were 
based on exogenous information of bads abatement costs from other studies and were 
likely to be subject to a wide range of errors. 
Fare et al. (1989) modified Farrell (l 957)'s traditional technical efficiency 
measures to allow asymmetrical treatments of desirable and undesirable outputs. Fare et al. 
(1989) used a non-parametric non-linear programming approach which only requires data 
on quantities and avoids shadow price estimations. Undesirable outputs were assumed to be 
weakly disposable rather than strongly disposable. Weak disposability implies that 
undesirable outputs cannot be disposed of without costs, while strong disposability implies 
that undesirable outputs can be disposed of for free. The weak disposability assumption is 
consistent with the fact that desirable and undesirable outputs are always produced jointly, 
and the reduction of undesirable outputs could cause a reduction of desirable outputs 
simultaneously. Fare et al. (1993) derived the negative shadow prices by Shephard's 
Lemma. Shadow prices reflect the opportunity cost of regulation and abatement activities 
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faced by firms. This enables firms to measure whether it is optimal to pollute under 
environmental regulations. 
Using the directional distance function, Chung, Fare and Grosskopf (1997) 
developed the Malmquist-Luenberger productivity index to incorporate both desirable and 
undesirable outputs in efficiency and productivity measurements. Weber and Domazlicky 
(1999) and Fare, Grosskopf and Pasurka (200 l) applied the directional output distance 
function to measure how pollution influenced productivity growth in manufacturing. 
Domazlicky and Weber (2004) used this approach to account for toxic chemic releases in 
measuring chemical industry's productive efficiency. Fare et al. (2004) employed the 
directional output distance function to measure technical efficiency in electric utilities that 
produce electricity and S02• This model was used in transportation by Weber and Weber 
(2004) to measure state trucking producing accounting for traffic fatalities as an 
undesirable output. Pathomsiri et al. (2007) employed this model to study the impact of 
delays on airport productivity. 
41 
CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY AND DAT A 
Methodology 
Following Chung, Fare and Grosskopf (1997), I denote desirable outputs as y E R~, 
the undesirable outputs as b E Rt and the inputs as x E R~. The technology can be 
described by output sets: 
P(x)={(y, b): x can produce (y, b)}. (4.1) 
This means that input vector x produces the combinations of desirable and 
undesirable outputs (y, b ). The technology is required to satisfy the following axioms: 
{O} E P(O). 
P(x) is compact. 
P(x') ;;i P(x) ifx' 2". x. 
( 4.2a) 
( 4.2b) 
(4.2c) 
Axiom (4.2a) implies that null input vector yields zero output; (4.2b) implies that 
finite inputs can only produce finite outputs; ( 4.2c) implies that all inputs are strongly 
disposable and that an increase in inputs cannot lead to a reduction in outputs. 
In addition to the above axioms, I assume that bad outputs are weakly disposable 
and good outputs and bad outputs are together weakly disposable, which indicates that bad 
outputs cannot be reduced without reducing good outputs in a single period, that is: 
(y, b) E P(x) and O:,; S:,; 1 imply (Sy, Sb) E P(x), (4.3) 
This means that proportional reductions in (y, b) are possible with no change in x. 
In addition, desirable outputs (y) are strong disposable, which means desirable outputs can 
be reduced without reducing undesirable outputs in a single period, that is: 
(y, b) E P(x) and y' :,; y imply (y', b) E P(x). (4.4) 
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Equations (4.3) and (4.4) represent the asymmetry between desirable and 
undesirable outputs. 
Finally, the assumption of null-jointness between goods and bads is imposed. This 
means that no desirable outputs can be produced unless undesirable outputs are also 
produced in a single period. The null-jointness is defined as: 
(y, b) E P(x) and b = 0 then y = 0. (4.5) 
However, desirable outputs could be increased while undesirable outputs are decreased 
over time due to production possibility frontier shift. 
Chambers and Pope (1996) proposed the directional distance function is given by: 
cf;,'(x, y, b; g) = max{~: (y, b) + ~g E P(x)}, (4.6) 
where g=(gy, -gb) is a vector of directions, and desirable outputs are expanded in the gy 
direction, and undesirable outputs are contracted in the -gb direction. In this case, let g= (y ,-
b ), which means the projected direction depends on individual trucking's good output as 
well as bad outputs. The maximum feasible proportion for desirable outputs expansion and 
undesirable outputs contraction is represented by~-
In Figure 4.1, reference technology Pw(x) assumes weak disposability for band its 
production frontier is OABCD. Producers A, B, C, and Dare on the production possibility 
frontier, therefore, they are efficient. Producer Eis below the frontier and operates 
inefficiently. On the contrary, reference technology Ps(x) assumes strong disposability for 
bad; its frontier is OKBCD. The area OKBA reflects the possible production which is 
feasible under strong disposability of both outputs but not feasible when undesirable output 
is weak disposable. The product set Pw(x) satisfies all the assumptions (4.2)-(4.5) that the 
segment OAB with positive slope reflects weak disposability of undesirable output, and 
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Pw(x) begins from the origin reflects that desirable output is "null-joint" with undesirable 
output, which means the only method to produce no bad outputs is to produce no good 
outputs. I distinguish the traditional output distance function and the directional output 
distance function in Figure 4.1. Assuming strong disposability of both y and b, the 
technical efficiency of Eis based on the Shephard's output distance function and calculated 
by the ratio OE/OL. That is, if both desirable and undesirable outputs expand by the factor 
OE/OL, the state could move to point Lon the frontier and be technically efficient. 
However, it is not credible to improve efficiency by producing more bads. Alternatively, if 
bad outputs are weakly disposable, using a directional distance function, the technical 
efficiency can be defined as EH/Og. This means that the state would improve its efficiency 
and move in the direction g to point H on the frontier by increasing desirable output while 
decreasing undesirable output. 
g 
y 
::,..1 ~ B 
K --- --------,---
J 
0 
P.(x) 
A 
' 
' 
I 
' 
' 
' 
, 
' 
' ' 
" 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' ' 
E= (y, b) 
' 
' 
' :G 
Figure 4.1. Directional Distance Function 
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To show the relation of the directional output distance function and Shephard's 
output distance function, let g=(y, b ). Chung, Fare and Grosskopf ( 1997) showed that: 
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~ 1 
d0 (x,y, b; g) = d ( b) - 1. 
o x,y, 
Based on directional distance functions, Chung, Fare and Grosskopf (1997) 
calculated the Malmquist- Luenberger (ML) productivity index. Let periods sand t 
represent the base period and the current period, respectively. The ML index is 
I 
( (1 + ctKcxs, ys, bs; -bs)) ( 1 + ~cxs,ys, bs; ys, -bs) )lo 5 
= (1 + ciK(x',y',b';y',-b1)) x (1 + ~(x',y',b1;y1,-b1)) 
(4.7) 
(4.8) 
If the ML index in (4.8) is equal to one, it indicates no productivity change between 
periods s and t; an ML index greater than one implies productivity improvement, while an 
ML index less than one implies a productivity decline. 
Following Fare et al. (1994), the index can also be decomposed into technical 
efficiency change (EFFCH) and technical change (TECH), where 
1 + d5(x5 y 5 b5 · -b5 ) 
EFFCH = - 0 ' ' ' , and 
1 + d~(x1,y1, bl; -bl) 
[
( 1 + ~(XS, ys, bS; -bS)) ( 1 + ~(X', yt, b'; yl, -bl) )]0 5 
TECH = x -'----------'-
( 1 + ctKcxs,ys, bS; -bS)) ( 1 + ciK(xl,yl, bl; yl, -b')) 
(4.9) 
(4.10) 
Technical efficiency change (EFFCH) measures the change in technical efficiency 
between the two periods. If EFFCH = l, production exhibits no efficiency change between 
periods s and t. If EFFCH > ( <) I, production exhibits technical efficiency improvement 
(decline). On the other hand, technical change (TECH) measures the geometric mean of the 
shift in the production possibility frontier, which reflects the technical progress (or regress) 
in producing the good and bad outputs. If TECH = I, production exhibits no technical 
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change between periods s and t. If TECH > ( <) 1, production exhibits technological 
progress (regress). 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the EFFCH and TECH components. Suppose under CRS 
technology, a firm operates at point E in periods and at point L in period t. The firm is 
technical inefficient in both periods. The technical efficiency change can be represented by 
l+LJ/Og . [l+LG/Og l+EH/Og]0.5 -~~ . The techmcal change can be represented by x . 
l+EH/Og l+LI/Og l+HF/Og 
)" 
3· 
A' H E 
A P'(x) 
g 
0 D' D b 
Figure 4.2. A Mixed-Period Distance Function 
In this study, the directional output distance function can be estimated non-
parametrically by solving liner programming problems. Suppose in period t=l , ... ,T, there 
are i= 1, ... ,I observations operate under CRS technology, I construct the non-parametric 
piecewise linear production possibility set P(x) as follows: 
I 
P(x) = {(y, b): I Aj Yfm ~ Yfm, m= l, ... ,M, 
i=l 
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I 
I\b\ = bfk. k = 1, ... , K, 
i=1 
I I Aj xf0 ~ xfn, n = 1, ... ,N, 
i=1 
i=l, ... ,l}, (4.11) 
where Ai are the weights assigned to each observation when constructing the production 
possibility frontier. 
The inequality on input and desirable output constraints assume strongly disposable, 
whereas the equality on undesirable outputs assume weakly disposable. This production set 
satisfies the assumption that both desirable and undesirable outputs are null-joint, that is: 
I 
I bfk > o. k = l, ... ,K, (4.12a) 
i=l 
i=l, ... ,l. (4.12b) 
Condition (4.12a) indicates that each bad output is produced by at least one 
observation, and condition (4.12b) indicates that each observation produces at least one bad 
output. 
Thus, the single-period directional distance function incorporating air pollutants as 
weakly disposable bad outputs can be estimated by solving the following linear 
programming problems: 
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I 
S. t. L "-iY[m <". (1 + ~)Yfm, m = 1, ... M, 
i=l 
I I A;bfk = c1- ~)bfk, k = 1 .... K, 
i=l 
I L /1.jXfn :,; xfn, n = 1, ... N, 
i=l 
i = 1, ... 1, (4.13) 
ctrcxs, ys, b5; ys, -bs) = max~ 
I 
S. t. L A;Yfm <". (1 + ~)Yfm, m = 1, ... M, 
i=l 
I I Aibfk = (1 - ~)bfk, k = 1, ... K, 
i=l 
I L A;Xf n :,; xf n• n = 1, ... N, 
i=l 
i = 1, ... I. (4.14) 
The mixed-period directional distance function whereby the observed (xf, yf, bf) 
for producer i in period s compared to the reference technology at time period t can be 
estimated by solving the following linear programming problem: 
ctrcxs,ys,b5;ys,-bs) = max~ 
I 
S. t. L A;Yfm <". (1 + ~)Yfm, m = 1, ... M, 
i=l 
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I I 11.;bfk = c1 - ~)bfk. k = 1 .... K, 
i=l 
I L 11.;xfn :<::: xf n• n = 1, ... N, 
i=1 
i = 1, ... I. ( 4.15) 
The mixed-period directional distance function whereby the observed (xf, yt, bf) for 
producer i in period t compared to the reference technology at time period s can be 
estimated by solving the following leaner programming problem: 
ctr ex', y', b'; y', -b') =max~ 
I 
S. t. I A;Yfm ;::: (1 + ~)Yim• m= 1, ... M, 
i=l 
I I 11.;bfk = c1 - ~)bfk. k = 1, ... K, 
i=l 
I L Ajxj0 ::; xf01 n = 1, ... N, 
i=l 
i = 1, ... I ( 4.16) 
The equality constrains in (4.13) through (4.16) impose the weak disposability 
assumption on bads. The values obtained from (4.13) through (4.16) are used to calculate 
the ML productivity index defined by (4.8), the EFFCH index defined by (4.9), and the 
TECH index defined by ( 4.10). 
Alternatively, one could assume bads to be strongly disposable by replacing the 
equality constraint in (4.13) with 
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I I \b[k ~ c1 - ~)bfk, k = 1, ... K, 
i=l 
The same strong disposability constraint can be imposed in (4.14) through (4.16) by 
changing the time superscripts accordingly. 
Traditionally, bad outputs tended to be omitted from the production process, which 
means b= 0. If so, one would drop the constraints on bads from equations ( 4.13)-( 4.16). 
For comparison purpose, I consider bad outputs to be weakly disposable in Model I, 
strongly disposable in Model 2 or non-existent in Model 3 in the production process. I 
summarize the treatments of bads in Table 4.1 below. The sign "W" and "S" represent 
weak and strong disposability, respectively. The sign"-" denotes omission of bads. Inputs 
and desirable output are assumed strong disposable in the three models. 
Table 4.1. Overview of Models 
Variables Model I 
Desirable output S 
Inputs S 
Bads W 
Data 
Model 2 
s 
s 
s 
Model 3 
s 
s 
A set of balanced panel data covering years 2000 through 2007 for the 48 
contiguous states was used for this analysis. Data were obtained from multiple sources: 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Census 
Bureau, Federal Highway Administration, and U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
The trucking industry (classified by NAICS 484) produces one desirable output measured 
in terms of state trucking gross domestic product (GDP) (y), and eight undesirable 
byproducts GHG (b 1), particles less than 10 micrometers in diameter (PMlO) (b2), particles 
less than 2.5 micrometers in diameter (PM2.5) (b3), carbon monoxide (CO) (b4), nitrogen 
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oxides (NOx) (b5), sulfur dioxide (S02) (b6), and volatile organic compounds (VOC) (b7). 
Among these outputs, the data of bad outputs b1-b7 are only available for years 2002 and 
2005. The trucking industry uses seven inputs including labor (x1), interstate highway (x2), 
non-interstate highway (x3), trailers and semi-trailers (x4), fuel (x5), heavy-duty trucks (x6), 
and interstate highways in adjoining states (x7). Variable definitions are displayed in Table 
4.2. 
Table 4.2. Variable Definitions 
Variables 
Desirable Output 
y 
Undesirable Output 
bl 
b2 
b3 
b4 
b5 
b6 
b7 
Inputs 
xi 
x2 
x3 
x4 
x5 
x6 
x7* 
Definitions Units of Measurement 
Real GDP Million dollars of state trucking GDP 
GHG emissions Thousand metric tons of CO2-equivalents 
PM IO emission Metric tons of PM IO emission 
PM 2.5 emission Metric tons of PM 2.5 emission 
CO emission Metric tons of CO emission 
NOx emission Metric tons ofNOx emission 
S02 emission Metric tons of S02 emission 
voe emission Metric tons of VOC emission 
Labor Number of employees in trucking 
Interstate Highway Miles of interstate highway 
Non-interstate Highway Miles of non-interstate highway 
Trailers and Semi- Numbers of registered trailers and semi-
Trailers trailers 
Fuel Thousands of barrels of diesel fuel 
Trucks Numbers of registered heavy-duty trucks 
Interstate Highway in Miles of adjoining states interstate 
Adjoining State* highway 
* Miles of interstate highway in adjoining states are calculated based on the interstate 
highway data from the Highway Statistics Series. 
Real trucking GDP (y) is measured in millions of chained 2000 dollars; GHG (b1) is 
measured in thousand tons of CO2-equivalent emitted by heavy-duty trucks annually; toxic 
air pollutants, including PMIO (b2), PM2.5 (b3), CO (b4), NOx (b5), S02 (b6), and VOC (b7), 
are measured in tons of pollutants emitted by heavy-duty trucks annually; labor (x1) is 
measured by the annual average number of employees in the trucking industry; interstate 
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highway (x2), non-interstate highway (x3) and interstate highway in adjoining states (x4) 
are all measured in miles; trucks (x5), trailers and semi-trailers (x6) are measured by annual 
registered heavy-duty trucks, trailers and semi-trailers, and fuel (x1) is measured by 
thousands of barrels of diesel fuel used. Table 4.3 displays the descriptive statistics. 
Table 4.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Definition Mean St Dev. Minimum Maximum 
y Real GDP 1977.56 1862.671 164 9851 
bl GHG 7763.59 8325.91 665.18 49603.71 
b2* PM 10 1993.15 2403.03 67.30 15195.10 
b3* PM2.5 1726.96 2108.09 56.87 13422.48 
b4* co 17839.61 18036.03 493.52 93212.57 
b5* NOx 61578.44 64690.47 1927.40 339792.77 
b6* S02 1329.18 1236.54 69.75 7459.11 
b7* voe 3432.42 3776.34 100.35 21879.12 
XJ Labor 29767 25978.60 2241 120014 
X2 Interstate Highway 945.76 584.26 41 3234 
X3 Non-interstate 2372.17 1518.753 192 10202 Highway 
X4 Trailers and Semi- 106256 147134.50 4105 818997 Trailers 
X5 Fuel 20509.28 18591.08 1245.08 119276.08 
X6 Trucks 37644 41928.65 1404 286024 
X7 Interstate Highway 4523.21 1980.93 224 8876 in Adjoining States 
*Data are available for years 2002 and 2005 only. 
The trucking industry achieved an average GDP of $1.98 billion per state per year 
during 2000-2007. Rhode Island generated the least trucking output in 2001 while 
California generated the most in 2007; California also emitted the most GHG at nearly 50 
million metric tons in 2007, while state trucking sector emitted an average of7.8 million 
metric tons. Additionally, California emitted the most of all toxins except S02 (Texas 
emitted the most S02), while Rhode Island emitted the least toxic air pollutants. On 
average, more than 37 thousand heavy-duty trucks and more than I 06 thousand trailers and 
semi-trailers were registered in a state, and each state employed roughly an average of 
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30,000 workers, and owned about 946 miles of interstate highway, more than 2.2 thousand 
miles of non-interstate highways and more than 4.5 thousand miles of adjoining states 
interstate highway on average. Tucking industry fuel averaged 205 million barrels of diesel. 
Among the states, Texas consumed most diesel fuel while Vermont consumed the least. 
The total state consumption of diesel in the trucking industry was about 878 million 
barrels in 2000 and increased to nearly 1.1 billion barrels in 2007, which increased almost 
by 25 percent. The percentage increase in fuel consumption is consistent with the increase 
in GHG emissions. As showed in Figure 4.3, total trucking GHG emissions were 330 
million metric tons in 2000 and increased to 409 million metric tons in 2007, up by 24 
percent. GHG emissions were increased along with the increase of trucking GDP expect a 
decrease of GDP occurred during 2000 and 2002. Total real trucking GDP in 2000 was 
$92 billion and increased by 14 percent to 105 billion in 2007. 
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The utilization of inputs and production of desirable output and GHG increased 
between 2000 and 2007 generally, but the quantities of toxic air pollutants except S02 
declined significantly from 2002 to 2005. In Figure 4.4, total NOx emission from heavy-
duty trucks reduced by nearly 21 percent to 2.6 million thousand tons from 2002 to 2005. 
PMIO and PM 2.5 also decreased by more than 12 percent between 2002 and 2005, but 
S02 increased slightly by 4.8 percent to 67 thousand tons during the same period. The 
reductions of toxic air pollutants were mainly caused by increasingly stringent emission 
standards since 1990. For example, according to the DOT (2005), due to the stricter new 
emission standards (2007 level), the 2010 NOx factor for combination diesel trucks is 67 
percent lower than that in 2002 (2004 level standards). The EPA also estimated that air 
toxic emissions would reduce by 60 percent between 1999 and 2020 due to national and 
local emission controls (EPA, 2006). 
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Figure 4.4. Total Toxic Air Pollutants Emissions in 2002 and 2005 
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CHAPTER 5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Incorporating GHG in Trucking Efficiency and Productivity 
Using production and GHG data for 2000 through 2007, trucking efficiency and 
productivity were estimated in three models. In Model I, GHG is included as a bad output 
and assumed to be weakly disposable, while GHG is assumed to be a strongly disposable 
bad output in Model 2. Model 3 ignores GHG when constructing the reference technology. 
For each model, the value generated by a single-period directional distance function 
(4.13) represents the distance from an observation to the production possibility frontier. 
Thus if~ = 0, the observation is efficient. If~ > 0, the observation is inefficient, and higher 
scores indicate higher levels of inefficiency. The descriptive statistics of the inefficiency 
scores obtained by solving the linear programming problems in Models (I)- (3) are 
displayed in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1. Average Inefficiency Scores by Year (2000-2007) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Model 1 
Mean 0.087 0.099 0.108 0.131 0.121 0.119 0.117 0.087 
SD 0.104 0.113 0.125 0.134 0.127 0.125 0.128 0.103 
Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Max 0.341 0.438 0.425 0.404 0.400 0.362 0.430 0.344 
Model 2 
Mean 0.105 0.127 0.142 0.184 0.159 0.153 0.153 0.105 
SD 0.128 0.155 0.171 0.193 0.149 0.151 0.163 0.127 
Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Max 0.517 0.836 0.796 0.990 0.430 0.455 0.567 0.509 
Model 3 
Mean 0.107 0.137 0.158 0.190 0.167 0.162 0.165 0.107 
SD 0.127 0.153 0.172 0.192 0.148 0.152 0.162 0.126 
Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Max 0.517 0.836 0.796 0.990 0.437 0.455 0.567 0.509 
In all three models, average inefficiency was incurred for 2000-2007. For example, 
for year 2000, the average inefficiency score in Model 1 was 0.087, which implies that 
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after accounting for GHG as a weakly disposable bad output, states could expand good 
output and contract GHG by an average of 8.7 percent at a given input level; the average 
inefficiency score in Model 2 was 0.105, which means that states could expand their good 
output and contract GHG by an average of 10.5 percent; the average score in Model 3 for 
was 0.107, which implies that states could expand good output by I 0. 7 percent at a given 
input level in that year. The inefficiency scores were the largest in Model 3 because the 
model ignores bad output. This relaxation of (4.11) in Model 3 failed to account for GHG 
and state's effort to control pollution. As a result, Models 3 allows a larger technology set 
and higher inefficiency scores compared to Models I and 2. Also, the inefficiency scores 
were greater in Model 2 in which GHG was strongly disposable compared to those in 
Model 1 in which bad output is weakly disposable because the technology set for a weakly 
disposable GHG (defined by Model 1) was nested within the technology set for a strongly 
disposable GHG (defined by Model 2), and Model I credits states with tighter emission 
standards. In all three models, the average inefficiency was the largest in 2003, and this 
might be due to the lowest fuel efficiency that year. 11 
Table 5.2 presents the average annual technical inefficiency scores by state. The 
average inefficiency score in Model I was 0.109, which indicates that states could, on 
average, expand good output and contract GHG by 10.9 percent when bad output was 
weakly disposable. Model 3 generated higher average annual inefficiency scores, which 
reflects the higher inefficiency of the industry for each state, and inefficiency scores 
generated by Model 2 were also greater than those generated by Model I . Different 
rankings of states' performances were found in the three models. For instance, the five least 
11 The estimations of average miles traveled per gallon of fuel consumed come from Highway Statistics ofFHWA (2001-
2008). 
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efficient states in Model 3 were Arizona, Utah, Louisiana, North Dakota, and Alabama, 
while the five least efficient states in Model I were Arizona, North Dakota, Louisiana, 
Virginia, and West Virginia, and the most inefficient states were Arizona, Utah, North 
Dakota, Alabama, and Georgia in Model 2. In this sample, most of the states experienced 
lower inefficiency in Model I than in Model 2, which means that more states were located 
interior of the frontier in Model 2. Referring to Figure 4.1 and comparing Models I and 2, 
eight states (California, Florida, Maine, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Texas, and 
Wisconsin) operated on the production possibility frontier; they were located on the 
production possibility frontier segment BCD. Five states (Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, 
and Tennessee) operated inefficiently in Model 2 but efficiently in Model I. These states 
were located on the production possibility frontier segment OAB. 
Table 5.2. Average Annual Inefficiency Scores by State (2000-2007) 
State Model I Model2 Model 3 
AL 0.254 0.340 0.340 
AZ 0.342 0.532 0.534 
AR 0.000 0.163 0.163 
CA 0.000 0.000 0.000 
co 0.121 0.137 0.138 
CT 0.000 0.000 0.001 
DE 0.000 0.000 0.071 
FL 0.000 0.000 0.000 
GA 0.238 0.324 0.324 
ID 0.222 0.245 0.245 
IL 0.000 0.011 0.011 
IN 0.000 0.011 0.011 
IA 0.114 0.256 0.256 
KS 0.250 0.290 0.290 
KY 0.016 0.018 0.018 
LA 0.309 0.310 0.363 
ME 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MD 0.158 0.161 0.164 
MA 0.000 0.000 0.016 
Ml 0.087 0.091 0.092 
MN 0.072 0.089 0.092 
MS 0.098 0.133 0.135 
57 
Table 5.2. Continued 
MO 0.072 0.116 0.116 
MT 0.176 0.176 0.222 
NE 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NV 0.000 0.000 0.038 
NH 0.121 0.122 0.147 
NJ 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NM 0.222 0.222 0.288 
NY 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NC 0.132 0.224 0.224 
ND 0.313 0.349 0.349 
OH 0.000 0.044 0.044 
OK 0.213 0.274 0.274 
OR 0.186 0.278 0.278 
PA 0.002 0.016 0.016 
RI 0.202 0.204 0.221 
SC 0.141 0.176 0.176 
SD 0.095 0.097 0.124 
TN 0.000 0.005 0.005 
TX 0.000 0.000 0.000 
UT 0.234 0.468 0.468 
VT 0.046 0.048 0.059 
VA 0.290 0.310 0.310 
WA 0.024 0.026 0.033 
WV 0.276 0.314 0.314 
WI 0.000 0.000 0.000 
WY 0.185 0.185 0.197 
Mean 0.109 0.141 0.149 
Most states experienced inefficiency between 2000 and 2007. This may be due to 
high driver turnover, information technology mismanagement, and the lack of skilled labor 
to take advantage of new technology (Lim and Condon, 2009). The more efficient states 
generally have lower trucking speed limits and implement state no-idling laws (EPA, 
2003b; Carr, 2010; American Transportation Research Institute, 2010). For example, 
California has trucking speed limit at 55 mph and requires no more than five minutes idling 
for heavy-duty trucks. New York and New Jersey regulate trucking speed limit to be 65 
mph, and the two states require no more than five minutes and three minutes idling, 
respectively. On the contrary, the speed limit for North Dakota, Louisiana, and West 
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Virginia is 70 mph, and the three states did not set no-idling laws during the study period. 12 
These laws are consistent with the requirements and recommendations of the EPA and 
AT A that lower highway speed limit and reduce idle to control trucking GHG emissions. 
Moreover, some states, which operated inefficiently in Model 2 but were efficient in 
Model, generally have lower trucking speed limits. For example, Arkansas's speed limit is 
65 mph, and Illinois's speed limit is 55 mph. This result implies that states with regulations 
that help to reduce emissions tend to be more efficient accounting for GHG. 
Table 5.3 presents the geometric mean of the Malmquist-Luenberger (ML) index 
and its technical change (TECH) and efficiency change (EFFCH) components by year. 13 A 
greater than one index value indicates improvements in productivity growth, technical 
change and efficiency change, while a value less than one indicates a decline. Productivity 
improvements were observed in 2003-2004, 2004-2005, and 2006-2007, and productivity 
declines were observed in other years in Model I. Productivity decreased in 2000-2001, 
2002-2003, and 2005-2006, and productivity increased in other years in Model 3 without 
incorporating GHG. The most significant productivity regress was occurred in 2000-2001, 
and this may be due to the September 11 attack and the economic recession that year 
(Apostolides, 2009). Trucking experienced an overall productivity growth from 200 I to 
2007 with an average increasing employment of inputs, including labor, trucks, and fuel. 
Productivity declined slightly in 2002-2003 and 2005-2006 with increasing output and 
inputs except decreasing number of trucks in the former. This decline with increasing 
output may be a result of inefficiency of utilization of resources, which can be presented by 
the negative efficiency change during the periods. 
12 West Virginia has set state no-idling law in June, 2010. 
13 The mean growth is measured by geometric means. 
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Table 5.3. Mean Productivity Change and Decomposition (2000-2007) 
Year 00-01 01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 05-06 06-07 
Model 1 
ML 0.961 0.996 0.983 1.04] 1.019 0.981 1.027 
EFFCH 0.990 0.993 0.981 1.008 1.002 1.002 1.026 
TECH 0.971 1.003 1.003 J.032 1.017 0.979 1.001 
Model 2 
ML 0.847 1.127 0.964 1.144 1.008 0.979 1.091 
EFFCH 0.983 0.989 0.966 1.018 1.005 1.002 1.039 
TECH 0.893 1.140 0.997 1.124 1.003 0.977 1.046 
Model 3 
ML 0.891 1.029 0.972 1.071 1.015 0.987 1.047 
EFFCH 0.975 0.984 0.975 1.015 1.005 0.998 1.049 
TECH 0.914 1.046 0.997 1.055 1.010 0.989 0.997 
In Model 1, state trucking productivity was improved by an average of 4.1 percent 
in 2003-2004. But for the same period, Model 2 estimated an average growth of 14.4 
percent, and Model 3 estimated a 7.1 percent average growth. This shows that different 
assumptions about bad in constructing the technology sets create different estimates. 
Although no consistent pattern is observed, the environmentally sensitive ML indexed 
derived from Model 1 were different from those derived from Model 2 and the 
conventional ML indexes in Model 3 in the time periods studied, suggesting that ignoring 
GHG emissions in freight trucking leads to biased productivity indexes. The periods of 
improvement and decline in productivity and its components were slightly different in all 
three models. In Model 1, a 0.3 percent improvement in technical change was observed in 
2002-2003, while technical regresses were observed in Models 2 and 3. 14 In the same 
model, technical progress was observed in all years except 2000-200 I and 2005-2006, 
while technical regresses were also observed in 2002-2003 in Models 2 and 3. In all three 
14 The ML index and the decomposition for all the 48 states are presented in Appendix A. 
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models, states experienced decreased efficiency until 2003, but became more efficient from 
2004 to 2007. 
An ANOVA F-test and a series of nonparametric tests are used to examine the 
differences of productivity change among three models and present the results in Table 5.4. 
From the results, the null hypothesis that no significant differences of ML in three models 
was failed to reject for years 2002-2003, 2004-2005, and 2005-2006, but was rejected in 
other years. 
Table 5.4. ANOVA F-test and NonEarametric Tests 
Year 00-01 01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 05-06 06-07 
ANOVA-F 9.412 2.156 1.641 5.131 2.080 0.273 3.340 
(Prob> F) (0.000) (0.120) (0.198) (0.007) (0.129) (0.762) (0.038) 
Kruskal-Wallis 18.738 24.567 3.248 21.276 1.208 0.180 5.889 
(Prob> x2l (0.000) (0.000) (0.197) (0.000) (0.547) (0.914) (0.053) 
Median 8.635 23.001 3.651 20.523 0.267 0.166 7.694 
(Prob> x2l (0.013) (0.000) (0.161) (0.000) (0.876) (0.921) (0.021) 
Van der Waerden 18.051 20.251 2.601 19.132 2.044 0.162 5.160 
(Prob> x2) (0.000) (0.000) (0.271) (0.000) (0.360) (0.922) (0.076) 
Savage 13.425 14.924 0.735 14.769 1.781 0.293 7.720 
(Prob> x2) (0.001) (0.001) (0.692) (0.001) (0.411) (0.864) (0.021) 
The ratio of cumulated ML index in Model I over cumulated ML index in Model 2 
was calculated to see the differences in productivity due to the lack of strong disposability 
over time. The results show that ML differences existed between Model I and Model 2, 
which are displayed in Table 5.5. The ratio measures the extent of environmental 
compliance. If the ratio is greater than I, the conventional ML understates productivity and 
is therefore biased downward. If the ratio is less than I, weak disposability results in a loss 
in productivity. If the ratio is one, the two productivity measures are equal. The results 
indicate that the conventional ML understated productivity in 18 states by conventional ML, 
and 22 states experienced productivity losses under the weak disposability assumption. In 
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addition, the productivity of each state was improved by an average of 7 percent over time 
under the weak disposability assumption of GHG. 
Table 5.5. The Ratio of (Cumulated ML I)/ (Cumulated ML 2) 
State cumulated ML! cumulated ML2 ( cumulated ML I)/ 
(cumulated ML 2) 
AL 0.974 0.995 0.979 
AZ 0.987 1.035 0.954 
AR 0.983 0.990 0.993 
CA 0.952 na na 
co 1.019 0.927 1.099 
CT 1.017 na na 
DE 1.094 27.593 0.040 
FL 0.978 na na 
GA 0.999 0.989 1.010 
ID 0.997 0.968 1.030 
IL 0.987 1.020 0.968 
IN 1.000 1.042 0.959 
IA 0.988 0.972 1.016 
KS 0.995 1.012 0.983 
KY 1.008 0.989 1.019 
LA 1.119 0.725 1.543 
ME 1.036 0.854 1.213 
MD 1.009 1.172 0.861 
MA 0.995 1.123 0.886 
MI 1.024 1.022 1.002 
MN 1.052 1.043 1.009 
MS 0.983 0.836 1.176 
MO 0.987 na na 
MT 1.062 na na 
NE 0.988 1.011 0.978 
NV 1.045 na na 
NH 1.087 na na 
NJ 0.976 na na 
NM 1.142 0.956 1.194 
NY 0.980 1.288 0.761 
NC 0.992 0.977 1.015 
ND 0.972 1.009 0.964 
OH 1.013 1.007 1.006 
OK 0.984 1.009 0.975 
OR 0.961 0.998 0.964 
PA 1.004 0.987 1.017 
RI 0.909 2.647 0.343 
SC 0.982 0.995 0.987 
SD 1.021 1.021 1.000 
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TN 1.032 1.033 0.999 
TX 1.023 1.173 0.872 
UT 1.011 0.948 1.067 
VT 1.007 0.874 1.152 
VA 0.994 1.000 0.993 
WA 0.966 1.171 0.825 
WV 0.966 0.991 0.974 
WI 1.012 1.016 0.996 
WY 1.009 0.974 1.036 
Mean 1.007 1.710 0.971 
*na: infeasible solution 
Finally, GHG abatement costs were estimated for each state. According to Fare, 
Grosskopf and Pasurka (2003), pollution abatement costs are calculated by the difference 
between the maximum feasible productions of the good output under strongly disposable 
technology and weakly disposable technology. In Figure 4.1, the pollution abatement cost 
for point Eis represented by distance FN, which indicates the amount of good output that 
must be reduced as a result of lack of free disposability. Thus, the amount of good output 
foregone is an abatement cost to producers. Denote the distance between an observation 
and the frontier defined by strongly disposable technology as~ , and the distance 
between an observation and the frontier defined by weakly disposable technology as D):'. If 
the good output is y, then the pollution abatement costs can be defined by (~ - D):') x y. 
Table 5.6 displays the abatement costs for each state in each year. Within each year, 
most states suffered no abatement costs. The mean abatement costs ranged between $26.23 
million and $94.47 million between 2000 and 2007, and the average abatement cost per 
state per year was $56.45 million. A total of 13 states (California, Colorado, Delaware, 
Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Texas, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming) did not incur any good output losses for between 2000 and 2007 
compared to their peers, which implies regulations did not constrain their efficiency. On 
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the contrary, five states (Arkansas, North Carolina, Georgia, Utah, and Iowa) incurred an 
average of more than $200 million losses per year due to regulations. The average 
abatement cost was the largest in 2004 at $94.4 7 million per state. The highest abatement 
cost, $751.29 million, was incurred by Arizona in 2003. On average, the average abatement 
cost accounts for only 0.6 percent of the average trucking GDP. 
Table 5.6. GHG Abatement Costs by State($ millions, 2000-2007) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
AL 12.35 l 07.08 71.50 282.22 160.47 309.73 257.87 13.53 
AZ 76.60 468.89 454.60 751.29 0.00 20.23 15.87 99.94 
AR 143.48 240.86 515.89 505.90 498.57 268.87 201.59 180.78 
CA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
co 5.66 36.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 59.93 48.43 6.85 
CT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
FL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
GA 182.62 86.58 139.10 267.68 413.84 335.07 480.21 205.97 
ID 7.96 1.35 0.24 9.16 25.60 29.46 15.64 9.84 
IL 0.00 0.00 0.00 366.06 52.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 
IN 0.00 4.98 86.97 138.97 35.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 
IA 210.27 194.22 197.49 271.39 313.76 325.24 263.47 148.33 
KS 23.60 4.46 15.28 19.65 60.96 71.47 143.99 25.23 
KY 0.00 21.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
LA 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.03 
ME 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MD 0.00 0.00 2.52 0.00 0.00 0.96 31.02 0.37 
MA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MI 0.00 1.04 0.00 30.54 16.07 2.90 32.90 0.00 
MN 74.47 0.00 11.93 0.00 0.00 26.94 44.61 86.33 
MS 0.00 26.32 7.68 72.31 103.86 97. l 3 16.32 0.00 
MO 12.53 137.59 70.06 257.34 241.76 135.72 137.42 13.64 
MT 1.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.13 
NE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.53 0.00 
NJ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NM 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.84 
NY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NC 102.00 234.30 202.45 458.58 496.86 344.02 260.89 103.78 
ND 5.77 3.04 19.75 8.72 3.08 12.22 43.65 7.40 
OH 0.00 314.43 203.25 375.l l 335.34 189.96 203.35 0.00 
OK 63.60 57.59 58.69 26.86 78.10 118.42 108.90 75.63 
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OR 13.61 22.25 96.96 245.74 254.18 213.70 67.44 14.72 
PA 0.00 75.22 0.00 0.00 147.47 160.78 123.21 0.00 
RI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.57 0.03 0.00 0.00 
SC 3.64 7.33 4.81 43.83 129.43 102.11 79.27 4.21 
SD 1.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.14 
TN 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.33 63.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 
TX 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
UT 286.36 145.68 255.51 206.93 181.83 154.65 364.16 348.41 
VT 0.09 1.25 2.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 
VA 0.00 10.49 0.00 62.73 22.80 73.25 145.56 1.44 
WA 15.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 19.00 
WV 14.50 13.03 26.82 34.14 12.02 24.36 25.06 15.35 
WI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
WY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Mean 26.23 46.15 50.91 94.47 76.01 64.11 64.84 28.87 
Accounting for Toxic Air Pollutants in Efficiency and Productivity 
Now apply the three models to measure efficiency and productivity change in the 
face for 6 toxic air pollutants: PMlO, PM2.5, CO, NOx, S02, and VOC. In Model 1, toxic 
air pollutants are included as six bad outputs and assumed to be weakly disposable. In 
Model 2, toxic air pollutants are assumed to be strongly disposable bad outputs. In Model 3 
toxic air pollutants are ignored when constructing the reference technology. 
The descriptive statistics of the annual inefficiency scores for 2002 and 2005 
obtained in Models (1)- (3) are displayed in Table 5.7. Between 2002 and 2005, 
inefficiency decreased in Model 1, while inefficiency increased in Model 2 and 3. As 
Model I defines the smallest technology set, and Model 3 defines the largest one, the 
inefficiency scores were the smallest in Model 2 and the largest in Model 3. Also, the 
technology set defined by Model 1 was nested within the technology set defined by Model 
2, and Model I credits states with tighter emission standards. Thus, the inefficiency scores 
were larger in Model 1 than Model 2. 
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Table 5.7. Inefficiency Scores in 2002 and 2005 
2002 2005 
Model 1 
Mean 0.009 0.008 
SD 0.016 0.013 
Min 0.000 0.000 
Max 0.082 0.046 
Model 2 
Mean 0.030 0.039 
SD 0.033 0.027 
Min 0.000 0.000 
Max 0.134 0.107 
Model 3 
Mean 0.037 0.039 
SD 0.031 0.027 
Min 0.000 0.000 
Max 0.134 0.107 
Table 5.8 presents the average technical inefficiency scores by state in 2002 and 
2005. The results show that 21 states were defined efficient in Model 1 which assumes 
weak disposability for toxic air pollutants, while only four states were efficient in Model 2 
which assumes strong disposability for bads. This implies that most truck firms relocate 
their inputs from producing good output to reducing toxic air pollutants, which reflects the 
increasingly stringent standards for truck engines since 1990. 
Table 5.8. Average Inefficiency Scores by State in 2002 and 2005 
State Model 1 Model 2 
AL 0.016 0.048 
AZ 0.000 0.000 
AR 0.000 0.000 
CA 0.000 0.041 
co 0.000 0.000 
CT 0.014 0.032 
DE 0.000 0.037 
FL 0.000 0.034 
GA 0.000 0.027 
ID 0.000 0.014 
IL 0.006 0.026 
IN 0.013 0.054 
IA 0.000 0.022 
KS 0.023 0.044 
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Model 3 
0.048 
0.000 
0.000 
0.041 
0.021 
0.032 
0.037 
0.034 
0.031 
0.047 
0.026 
0.054 
0.027 
0.046 
Table 5.8. Continued 
KY 0.013 0.046 0.046 
LA 0.017 0.034 0.037 
ME 0.000 0.022 0.042 
MD 0.000 0.041 0.041 
MA 0.000 0.037 0.039 
MI 0.003 0.018 0.018 
MN 0.021 0.046 0.046 
MS 0.024 0.042 0.042 
MO 0.021 0.046 0.046 
MT 0.019 0.038 0.038 
NE 0.019 0.031 0.032 
NV 0.000 0.067 0.067 
NH 0.000 0.016 0.021 
NJ 0.000 0.034 0.034 
NM 0.020 0.054 0.054 
NY 0.000 0.028 0.030 
NC 0.012 0.039 0.048 
ND 0.025 0.044 0.044 
OH 0.023 0.036 0.036 
OK 0.012 0.027 0.027 
OR 0.000 0.053 0.054 
PA 0.024 0.046 0.046 
RI 0.000 0.053 0.053 
SC 0.005 0.019 0.019 
SD 0.013 0.033 0.033 
TN 0.000 0.048 0.048 
TX 0.000 0.056 0.056 
UT 0.000 0.045 0.045 
VT 0.000 0.000 0.026 
VA 0.000 0.024 0.049 
WA 0.000 0.051 0.051 
WV 0.002 0.014 0.014 
WI 0.025 0.046 0.046 
WY 0.041 0.061 0.061 
Mean 0.009 0.035 0.038 
Different rankings of states' performances were also found in the three models. The 
five least efficient states in Model 1 were Wyoming, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Mississippi, 
and Kansas, while the five least efficient states in Model 2 were Nevada, Wyoming, Texas, 
New Mexico, and Oregon, the most inefficient states were Nevada, Wyoming, Texas, 
Oregon, and Indiana in Model 3. Moreover, three of the five least efficient states in Model 
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2, which were Nevada, Texas, and Oregon, operated efficiently in Model I. Within the 
three states, Nevada and Texas had already implemented no-idling laws in 2002. Texas and 
Oregon provided financial incentives for encouraging emission control equipment, which 
imply environmental policies could improve technical efficiency accounting for toxic air 
pollutants. 
Without considering state's effort to reduce toxic air pollutants, many states 
appeared inefficient. For example, the inefficiency score for California was 0.041 in Model 
2 compared to zero inefficiency in Model I. However, the California Air Resources Board 
set the Diesel Risk Reduction Plan to reduce diesel emissions from in-use and off-road 
diesel engines since 2000, and California also has the no-idling law and lower speed limits. 
The inetliciency result of California in Models 2 and 3 failed to credit the state for its 
efforts to improve environmental performance and reduce bad outputs. 
Table 5.9 presents the Malmquist-Luenberger (ML) index and its technical change 
(TECH) and efficiency change (TECH) components derived from the three models in 2002 
and 2005. Productivity change and its components are different in three models. In Model I, 
a productivity decline, technical regress, and efficiency stagnant were observed in 2002-
2005, while a productivity growth, technical progress, and efficiency decline were 
observed in Model 2 and Model 3. 
Table 5.9. Mean Productivity Change and Decomposition in 2002-2005 
Model I I Model 2 I Model3 
Year ML EFFCH TECH ML EFFCH TECH ML EFFCH TECH 
02-05 0.979 1.001 0.978 1.174 0.991 1.186 I. I 04 0.997 1.107 
Table 5.10 represents the productivity growth and its EFFCH and TECH 
components by state. An average productivity decline, technical regress, and stagnant 
efficiency change were observed in Model I, which assumes weakly disposability for toxic 
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air pollutants. Within the sample, 35 states experienced productivity decline, and IO states 
had productivity growth in Model I. The productivity decline could be explained by a 
technical regress possibly resulting from in-use old diesel trucks that had not been phased 
out. The trucking industry is not currently mandated to apply latest diesel engines or to 
retrofit old engines with pollution control equipment. Even for California, the state 
government did not enact regulations to modernize on-road trucks until December 2008 
(Thornton, Kagan and Gunningham, 2009). Thus, Model I with declined technical change 
seems more consistent with the current regulatory environment and trucking operations. In 
addition, productivity change and its components varied in different states. For example, 
when the weak disposability assumption is made, the variation range of productivity 
decline ranged from 0.1 percent for New Mexico to 34.6 percent for Arizona. Productivity 
change and its components also vary greatly in different models. For example, Colorado's 
productivity decreased by 3.1 percent in Model I while productivity improved by 23.2 
percent in Model 2 and by 28.6 percent in Model 3. 
Table 5.10. Productivit Chan e and Its Decom ositions b State in 2002 and 2005 
Model I Model 2 Model 3 
State ML EFFCH TECH ML EFFCH TECH ML EFFCH TECH 
AL 0.951 0.969 0.982 1.070 0.945 1.131 1.042 0.945 1.102 
AZ 0.654 1.000 0.654 1.340 1.000 1.340 1.092 1.000 1.092 
AR 1.419 1.000 1.419 0.973 1.000 0.973 1.145 1.000 1.145 
CA na 1.000 na 1.176 0.984 1.195 1.078 0.984 1.096 
co 0.969 1.000 0.969 1.232 1.000 1.232 1.286 1.043 1.233 
CT 0.890 0.973 0.915 1.049 0.940 1.116 1.023 0.940 1.089 
DE 0.901 1.000 0.901 na 0.931 na 0.897 0.931 0.964 
FL 0.919 1.000 0.919 0.958 0.936 1.023 1.025 0.936 1.095 
GA 0.973 1.000 0.973 1.117 0.953 1.173 1.062 0.960 I. I 07 
ID 1.077 1.000 1.077 1.053 0.973 1.081 1.123 1.038 1.082 
IL 0.984 1.013 0.971 2.963 1.018 2.911 1.122 1.018 I. I 03 
IN 0.984 1.025 0.960 1.182 1.033 1.144 1.126 1.033 1.090 
IA 1.002 1.000 1.002 1.210 0.959 1.262 1.087 0.968 1.123 
KS 0.936 0.956 0.979 1.042 0.933 1.116 1.024 0.938 1.092 
KY 0.972 1.025 0.948 1.175 1.030 1.140 1.123 1.030 1.090 
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Table 5.10. Continued 
LA 0.954 0.968 0.986 1.075 0.977 I .I 01 1.072 0.983 1.090 
ME 1.04] 1.000 1.041 1.060 0.958 1.106 1.092 0.997 1.095 
MD na 1.000 na na 0.935 na 1.029 0.934 I. I 02 
MA 0.948 1.000 0.948 1.040 0.931 1.117 1.028 0.934 I. I 00 
MI 1.477 1.006 1.469 na l.036 na 1.195 1.036 1.154 
MN 0.961 0.998 0.963 l. l 78 1.023 I. I 52 1.119 1.023 1.094 
MS 0.966 0.997 0.969 1.290 0.994 1.297 1.100 0.994 I. I 06 
MO 0.984 1.006 0.979 1.139 1.008 I. I 30 I. 105 l.008 1.097 
MT 0.919 0.964 0.954 1.070 0.929 1.152 1.027 0.929 1.106 
NE 0.935 0.963 0.971 1.125 0.946 1.189 1.046 0.948 1.103 
NV na 1.000 na na 1.134 na l .258 1.134 I. llO 
NH 0.995 1.000 0.995 1.315 1.032 1.274 1.173 1.042 1.126 
NJ 0.924 1.000 0.924 0.870 0.937 0.929 1.03 I 0.937 1.101 
NM 0.999 1.039 0.962 1.217 1.049 1.160 1.152 1.049 1.098 
NY 0.947 1.000 0.947 1.077 0.952 1. I 31 1.049 0.957 1.097 
NC 0.976 0.976 1.000 1.046 0.927 1.128 1.040 0.944 I. I 01 
ND 0.967 1.007 0.960 I. I 94 1.031 1.158 1. 127 1.031 1.092 
OH 0.982 1.008 0.975 1.180 1.018 1.159 1.115 1.018 1.095 
OK 0.990 1.024 0.966 3.656 1.054 3.470 1.154 1.054 1.095 
OR 0.903 1.000 0.903 1.125 0.993 1.133 1.090 0.995 1.095 
PA 0.970 0.993 0.976 1.123 0.992 1.132 1.089 0.992 1.097 
RI 0.903 1.000 0.903 0.994 0.904 1.100 0.983 0.904 1.088 
SC 1.048 1.011 1.037 1.572 1.039 1.513 1.590 1.039 1.530 
SD 0.978 1.014 0.965 I. I 63 1.026 1.133 1.122 1.026 1.093 
TN 0.970 l.000 0.970 1.123 0.994 1.129 1.092 0.994 1.098 
TX 0.937 1.000 0.937 1.235 1.035 1.194 1.137 1.035 1.099 
UT 1.150 1.000 I. I 50 1.215 1.028 1.182 1.128 1.028 1.097 
VT 0.907 1.000 0.907 1.145 1.000 1.145 1.148 1.05 l 1.092 
VA 1.036 1.000 1.036 1.082 0.954 1.134 1.098 1.002 1.096 
WA 0.974 1.000 0.974 1.168 1.018 1.147 1.112 1.018 1.092 
WV 0.921 0.996 0.925 0.563 0.974 0.579 l.078 0.974 1.108 
WI 1.016 1.029 0.987 1.143 1.035 I. I 05 1.126 1.035 1.088 
WY 1.050 1.082 0.971 1.309 1.122 1.167 1.233 1.122 l.099 
Mean 0.986 1.001 0.985 1.228 0.992 1.234 1.108 0.999 I. I 09 
*na: infeasible solution 
I use an ANOVA F-test and a series of nonparametric tests to examine the 
differences in productivity indexes in the three models. The results are displayed in Table 
5.11. The null hypothesis that no significant difference between Model I and Model 2 for 
2002 and 2005 was rejected, implying that the productivity indexes were statistically 
significantly different for the two models. 
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Table 5.11. ANOVA F-test and Nonparametric Tests 
ANOV A-F Kruskal-Wallis Median 
Year (Prob> F) (Prob > r.,2) (Prob> l) 
02-05 10.433 36.083 46.934 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Van der Waerden 
(Prob> l) 
28.805 
(0.000) 
Savage 
(Prob> r.,2) 
23.798 
(0.000) 
Toxic air pollutants abatement costs for each state were also estimated. Table 5.12 
displays the abatement costs for each state in 2002 and 2005. The mean abatement costs 
increased from $44.96 million in 2002 to $72.78 million in 2005. Unlike GHG emissions, 
toxic air pollutants abatement costs were incurred for most states, since they are subject to 
the environmental requirements and standards under the Clean Air Act amendments of 
1990. 
Table 5.12. Toxic Air Pollutants Abatement Costs by State in 2002 and 2005 ($ millions) 
2002 2005 
AL 29.05 84.35 
AZ 0.00 0.00 
AR 0.00 0.00 
CA 276.78 473.72 
co 0.00 0.00 
CT 0.00 21.00 
DE 0.00 16.69 
FL 0.00 238.06 
GA 5.29 163.73 
ID 0.00 15.70 
IL 105.57 93.87 
IN 141.56 134.05 
IA 0.00 86.36 
KS 8.22 38.72 
KY 50.67 48.95 
LA 23.58 15.05 
ME 0.00 18.23 
MD 6.03 91.02 
MA 0.00 95.42 
MI 79.37 0.00 
MN 63.40 24.30 
MS 16.92 23.70 
MO 68.75 73.64 
MT 0.00 14.42 
NE 3.25 35.41 
NV 51.25 0.00 
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Table 5.12. Continued 
NH 8.06 0.00 
NJ 0.00 226.66 
NM 15.84 13.88 
NY 7.69 157.94 
NC 0.00 168.40 
ND 9.89 2.61 
OH 81.57 37.38 
OK 31.69 0.00 
OR 56.58 77.36 
PA 90.94 108.62 
RI 0.00 18.37 
SC 32.75 0.00 
SD 9.62 5.61 
TN 160.65 210.62 
TX 482.70 305.33 
UT 53.19 32.36 
VT 0.00 0.00 
VA 0.00 I 00.18 
WA 96.80 76.42 
WV 0.00 13.05 
WI 69.30 59.49 
WY 8.20 0.00 
Mean 44.96 72.78 
Abatement Cost Estimation Accounting for GHG and Other Air Pollutants 
Finally, Model I and Model 2were used to estimate the abatement costs. Table 5.13 
displays the abatement costs for each state for 2002 and 2005. 15 The mean abatement costs 
increased from $48.63 million in 2002 to $75.56 million in 2005. The abatement costs for 
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, and Vermont were zero, while Texas, California, Tennessee, 
and Indiana each incurred over $100 million losses of output resulting from environmental 
regulations. 
15 The results of inefficiency scores and productivity index and its decompositions are displayed in Appendix B. 
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The abatement costs estimation implies that the costs of regulating both GHG and 
toxic air pollutants are not substantially higher than the costs of regulating only toxic 
pollutants from heavy-duty trucks, since these gases are all directly resulted from diesel 
fuel consumption. On average, the average abatement cost of all pollutants accounts for 
only 0.7 percent of the average trucking GDP. 
Table 5.13. Bad Outputs Abatement Costs by State in 2002 and 2005 ($ millions) 
2002 2005 
AL 29.05 112.78 
AZ 0.00 0.00 
AR 0.00 0.00 
CA 276.78 473.72 
co 0.00 0.00 
CT 0.00 22.58 
DE 0.00 16.69 
FL 0.00 238.06 
GA 5.29 163.73 
ID 0.00 15.70 
IL 163.66 0.00 
IN 141.56 134.05 
IA 0.00 86.36 
KS 8.01 68.02 
KY 53.70 48.95 
LA 23.58 46.11 
ME 0.00 18.23 
MD 6.03 91.02 
MA 0.00 95.42 
MI 94.35 0.00 
MN 73.20 35.42 
MS 40.27 49.98 
MO 70.58 97.98 
MT 0.00 16.63 
NE 3.25 54.32 
NV 51.25 0.00 
NH 0.00 0.00 
NJ 0.00 226.66 
NM 15.84 13.88 
NY 7.69 157.94 
NC 0.00 188.16 
ND 11.16 6.84 
OH 113.31 63.66 
OK 32.33 0.00 
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Table 5.13. Continued 
OR 56.58 77.36 
PA 101.84 158.86 
RI 0.00 18.37 
SC 40.86 0.00 
SD 10.12 8.02 
TN 160.65 210.62 
TX 482.70 305.33 
UT 53.19 32.36 
VT 0.00 0.00 
VA 0.00 100.18 
WA 96.80 76.42 
WV 0.00 15.72 
WI 96.20 80.59 
WY 14.58 0.00 
Mean 48.63 75.56 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
Air pollution is a threat to the environment and human health. Freight trucking is 
the main source of freight transportation emissions. Heavy-duty trucks emit large amounts 
of toxic air pollutants, such as nitrogen oxides and particulate matter, which cause serious 
diseases and harm public health. Also, heavy-duty trucks emit large amounts of greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions, which is the leading cause of global warming. 
Despite increased environmental restrictions on trucking air pollution and rising 
trucking GHG emissions in the past decades, no economic study had examined the 
potential GHG and air pollution reductions in the trucking sector and the associated private 
abatement costs to the industry. This study introduced air pollution (GHG emissions and 
toxic air pollutants) into the measurements of trucking productivity and efficiency. I 
conducted a benchmarking analysis of states' performance with and without air pollutants. 
The benchmarking analysis allows comparisons of the extent of emission control on 
performance and measures the private costs of abatement. This study estimated 
environmentally sensitive efficiency and productivity for the trucking industry in the 48 
contiguous states. 
First, I measured states' performance with and without GHG. The analytic results 
indicated that average inefficiency peaked in 2003. On average, each state could expand 
good output and reduce GHG emissions by I 0.9 percent per year, if they operate efficiently. 
Positive productivity growths were found in 2003-2004, 2004-2005, and 2006-2007 
accounting for GHG. I found that productivity was understated for 20 states and 21 states 
experienced productivity declines by conventional productivity measure. The average 
abatement cost was between $26.23 million and $94.47 million per state over the study 
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period, and the highest abatement cost ($751 million) was incurred by Arizona in 2003. 
The states of Arkansas, North Carolina, Georgia, Utah and Iowa would incur high 
abatement costs for GHG reduction. On the contrary, 13 states (California, Colorado, 
Delaware, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, 
Texas, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) incurred no good output loss in the face of pollution 
control; this suggests that these states could serve as industry benchmarks to their peers. 
Second, I incorporated six toxic air pollutants into the measurements of efficiency 
and productivity. Due to increased environmental regulatory constraints, most of the toxic 
air pollutants decreased dramatically between 2002 and 2005. The results showed that 
environmental inefficiency decreased during this period, and 21 states operated efficiently. 
Productivity indexes derived from the three models showed that omitting or ignoring toxic 
air pollutants in trucking production yielded statistically significant biased estimates. 
Between 2002 and 2005, productivity decline was observed during the study period and the 
main source of productivity change was technical regress. The average decline of technical 
change may be due to a large number of existing old trucks that have yet to meet the more 
stringent environmental standards. The average abatement cost was estimated to be $44.96 
million in 2002 and $72.78 million in 2005. The trucking industry in Texas incurred a 
private abatement cost $482 million in 2002, which was the highest among all states, 
followed by California, Tennessee, Indiana, and Illinois. 
Finally, I accounted for GHG and six other air pollutants to estimate the abatement 
costs for the trucking industry in each of the 48 states. The average abatement costs were 
$48.63 million in 2002 and $75.56 million in 2005. Thus, the costs of abating both GHG 
and toxic air pollutants were slightly higher than the costs of abating only the 6 toxic air 
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pollutants. In fact, the costs of restricting all emissions accounted for 0.7 percent of the 
industry GDP. 
Since GHG, NOx, CO, and other toxic pollutants are all direct results of fossil fuel 
combustion and diesel truck operations, devising policies to improve fuel economy and 
enhance operational performance could improve environmental quality and living 
conditions. 
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APPENDIX A 
Tables A.1-A.3 present the results of geometric means of state ML index and its 
components based on Model 1 accounting for GHG. Tables A.5-A.7 and A.9-A.l l present 
the results of geometric means of ML index and its components for Models 2 and 3. 
In Model 1, 23 states experienced productivity decline, and 22 states had 
productivity growth over the sample period. On average, a productivity decline ranged 
between 0.1 percent and 1.3 percent. Table A.2 shows that most states experienced 
stagnant average efficiency change. In Table A.3, technical regresses were observed in 23 
states, while technical progresses were observed in 21 states. On average, a productivity 
decline, technical regress and stagnant efficiency change were observed in Model 2 and 
Model 3. Technical change was the main source of productivity growth. Productivity 
change and its components varied in different models. 
Table A. I. State Malmquist-Luenberger Productivity Index in Model I 
State 00-01 01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 05-06 06-07 Mean 
AL 0.907 0.988 1.002 1.021 l.009 0.996 1.057 0.996 
AZ 0.893 0.998 1.011 l.231 0.925 0.986 0.977 0.998 
AR 1.080 0.935 l.012 0.996 0.987 0.968 1.011 0.998 
CA 1.139 0.918 0.989 1.005 0.987 0.948 0.981 0.993 
co 0.910 1.056 0.917 1.034 1.122 0.988 1.009 1.003 
CT 1.082 0.906 0.963 1.002 1.068 1.017 0.992 1.002 
DE 1.094 0.961 1.051 1.043 l.024 0.907 1.022 1.013 
FL 1.079 0.950 1.060 0.922 1.095 0.978 0.913 0.997 
GA 0.968 0.990 0.987 l.017 1.005 0.980 1.055 1.000 
ID 1.023 1.055 0.977 1.077 0.967 0.952 0.955 1.000 
IL 0.952 l.005 0.975 l.046 1.005 0.987 1.020 0.998 
IN 0.891 0.966 1.001 1.071 1.041 1.004 l.037 1.000 
IA 0.939 0.992 1.033 1.031 1.003 0.974 1.018 0.998 
KS 0.959 1.002 0.972 l.039 1.011 0.971 1.045 0.999 
KY 0.879 l. l 65 1.003 0.988 1.024 0.977 0.993 1.00] 
LA 0.937 1.154 0.792 1.121 1.064 0.956 l.147 1.016 
ME 1.092 0.931 0.944 1.047 l.011 0.982 1.038 1.005 
MD 0.994 0.998 1.020 1.059 0.949 0.935 1.062 1.001 
MA l .058 0.966 0.988 1.013 1.004 0.976 0.992 0.999 
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Table A. I. Continued 
MI 0.854 1.091 0.892 1.085 1.066 0.962 1.109 1.003 
MN 1.023 0.987 1.040 1.068 0.986 0.966 0.985 1.007 
MS 0.862 1.021 0.977 1.053 1.024 0.987 1.073 0.998 
MO 0.894 1.001 0.998 1.051 1.019 1.000 1.033 0.998 
MT 0.754 1.104 0.985 1. 146 0.988 I. I 38 1.007 1.009 
NE 0.949 1.056 0.956 1.032 1.025 1.017 0.959 0.998 
NV 0.986 1.012 1.063 0.997 1.016 0.967 1.006 1.006 
NH 1.024 1.001 0.833 1.086 1.017 0.932 1.237 1.012 
NJ 1. I 75 0.944 1.031 0.954 0.952 0.977 0.963 0.996 
NM 0.784 1.126 0.850 1.085 1. 121 1.064 1.178 1.019 
NY 1.165 0.915 1.001 0.979 0.974 0.965 1.000 0.997 
NC 0.994 0.970 I .008 1.021 0.996 0.994 1.011 0.999 
ND 0.840 0.999 1.01 I 1.054 1.028 0.999 1.058 0.996 
OH 0.932 1.007 0.997 1.040 1.032 0.974 1.037 1.002 
OK 0.813 1.011 1.022 I .059 0.999 1.002 1.107 0.998 
OR 0.944 0.979 0.985 1.040 1.007 1.013 0.997 0.994 
PA 0.906 1.022 0.999 1.035 l.021 0.994 1.033 1.001 
RI 1. I 12 1.004 0.828 0.991 0.991 0.996 1.006 0.986 
SC 1.008 1.023 0.965 0.964 1.026 0.972 1.026 0.997 
SD 0.862 1.025 1.008 1.121 1.029 1.018 0.975 1.003 
TN 0.991 0.989 0.987 1.054 1.022 0.985 1.006 1.005 
TX 1.047 0.922 1.061 1.001 1.035 0.944 1.021 1.003 
UT 1.066 0.924 0.984 1.019 1.021 0.977 1.026 1.002 
VT 0.871 0.982 1.035 l.144 1.049 0.966 0.982 1.001 
VA 0.915 1.000 0.990 1.047 0.973 0.967 1.114 0.999 
WA 1.041 0.979 0.975 1.029 1.027 0.967 0.952 0.995 
WV 0.909 0.951 1.032 1.028 1.048 0.969 1.037 0.995 
WI 0.967 1.009 1.055 0.999 1.083 0.905 1.004 1.002 
WY 0.809 0.908 1.027 1.075 1.075 1.042 1. I I I 1.001 
Table A.2. State Efficiency Change Index in Model I 
State 00-01 01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 05-06 06-07 Mean 
AL 0.969 0.970 1.007 0.989 0.997 1.015 1.057 1.000 
AZ 0.932 1.009 1.029 1.166 0.913 0.993 0.976 1.000 
AR 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
CA 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
co 0.959 1.007 0.922 0.970 1.134 1.018 1.003 1.000 
CT 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
DE 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
FL 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
GA 1.043 0.969 0.995 0.968 0.985 1.012 1.030 1.000 
ID 1.113 0.974 0.992 1.032 0.954 0.957 0.987 1.000 
IL 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
IN 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
IA 0.959 1.007 1.035 1.011 0.984 1.004 1.004 1.000 
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Table A.2. Continued 
KS 1.051 0.948 0.986 0.987 0.992 0.994 1.046 1.000 
KY 0.887 1.127 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
LA 0.990 1.302 0.712 1.003 1.028 0.952 1.110 1.000 
ME 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
MD 1.038 0.969 0.995 1.020 0.965 0.957 1.062 1.000 
MA 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
MI 0.913 1.031 0.902 1.016 1.064 0.983 1.110 1.000 
MN 1.135 0.929 1.076 0.954 0.971 0.979 0.973 1.000 
MS 0.875 1.010 0.961 1.045 1.034 1.02] 1.067 1.000 
MO 0.951 0.985 1.003 1.022 0.998 1.018 1.025 1.000 
MT 0.868 1.002 0.999 1.080 0.953 1.107 1.011 1.000 
NE 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
NV 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
NH 1.000 1.000 0.801 1.017 1.019 0.934 1.289 1.000 
NJ 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
NM 0.876 1.073 0.829 1.023 1.076 1.063 1.098 1.000 
NY 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
NC 1.045 0.974 1.002 0.994 0.974 1.015 0.997 1.000 
ND 0.896 0.974 1.025 1.009 0.994 1.030 1.082 1.000 
OH 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
OK 0.864 0.991 1.009 1.042 0.993 1.037 1.080 1.000 
OR 1.005 0.975 0.994 1.015 0.978 1.040 0.995 1.000 
PA 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.982 1.018 1.001 1.000 1.000 
RI 1.232 0.947 0.835 0.986 1.000 1.008 1.032 1.000 
SC 1.054 1.000 0.945 0.964 1.029 0.995 1.018 1.000 
SD 0.948 0.926 1.032 1.057 0.994 0.961 1.093 1.000 
TN 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
TX 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
UT 1.042 0.967 0.979 1.003 1.005 0.999 1.016 1.001 
VT 0.961 0.932 1.054 1.065 1.020 1.000 0.976 1.000 
VA 1.029 0.960 0.994 0.987 0.962 0.979 1.098 1.000 
WA 1.095 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.914 1.000 
WV 0.981 0.919 1.034 0.991 1.036 0.983 1.064 1.000 
WI 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
WY 0.916 0.854 1.036 1.013 1.053 1.066 1.086 1.000 
Table A.3. State Technical Change Index in Model 1 
State 00-01 01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 05-06 06-07 Mean 
AL 0.936 1.019 0.996 1.033 1.012 0.981 1.000 0.996 
AZ 0.958 0.988 0.982 1.056 1.013 0.993 1.002 0.998 
AR 1.080 0.935 1.012 0.996 0.987 0.968 1.011 0.998 
CA 1.139 0.918 0.989 1.005 0.987 0.948 0.981 0.993 
co 0.949 1.049 0.995 1.065 0.990 0.971 1.006 1.003 
CT 1.082 0.906 0.963 1.002 1.068 1.017 0.992 1.002 
DE 1.094 0.961 1.051 1.043 1.024 0.907 1.022 1.013 
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Table A.3. Continued 
FL 1.079 0.950 1.060 0.922 1.095 0.978 0.913 0.997 
GA 0.928 1.021 0.992 1.051 1.020 0.968 1.023 1.000 
ID 0.919 1.083 0.985 1.044 1.013 0.994 0.968 1.000 
IL 0.952 1.005 0.975 1.046 1.005 0.987 1.020 0.998 
IN 0.891 0.966 1.001 1.071 1.041 1.004 1.037 1.000 
IA 0.979 0.986 0.999 1.019 1.019 0.971 1.014 0.998 
KS 0.912 1.057 0.986 1.052 1.019 0.977 1.000 0.999 
KY 0.990 1.034 1.003 0.988 1.024 0.977 0.993 1.001 
LA 0.947 0.886 1.111 1.118 1.035 1.004 1.033 1.016 
ME 1.092 0.931 0.944 1.047 1.011 0.982 1.038 1.005 
MD 0.958 1.031 1.025 1.039 0.983 0.976 1.000 1.001 
MA 1.058 0.966 0.988 1.013 1.004 0.976 0.992 0.999 
MI 0.936 1.058 0.989 1.068 1.002 0.978 0.999 1.003 
MN 0.902 1.063 0.966 1.120 1.016 0.987 1.013 1.007 
MS 0.986 1.012 1.017 1.008 0.990 0.967 1.006 0.998 
MO 0.940 1.016 0.995 1.028 1.021 0.982 1.007 0.998 
MT 0.869 1.102 0.986 1.061 1.037 1.028 0.996 1.009 
NE 0.949 1.056 0.956 1.032 1.025 1.017 0.959 0.998 
NV 0.986 1.012 1.063 0.997 1.016 0.967 1.006 1.006 
NH 1.024 1.001 1.040 1.068 0.998 0.998 0.960 1.012 
NJ 1.175 0.944 1.031 0.954 0.952 0.977 0.963 0.996 
NM 0.895 1.050 1.025 1.060 1.042 1.001 1.074 1.019 
NY 1.165 0.915 1.001 0.979 0.974 0.965 1.000 0.997 
NC 0.951 0.996 1.006 1.027 1.023 0.979 1.013 0.999 
ND 0.938 1.026 0.987 1.045 1.033 0.970 0.978 0.996 
OH 0.932 1.007 0.997 1.040 1.032 0.974 1.037 1.002 
OK 0.942 1.020 1.013 1.016 1.006 0.966 1.025 0.998 
OR 0.939 1.004 0.991 1.025 1.030 0.974 1.003 0.994 
PA 0.906 1.022 0.999 1.055 1.002 0.993 1.033 1.001 
RI 0.903 1.060 0.991 1.005 0.991 0.988 0.975 0.986 
SC 0.957 1.024 1.022 1.000 0.997 0.977 1.008 0.997 
SD 0.909 1.107 0.977 1.061 1.035 1.059 0.892 1.003 
TN 0.991 0.989 0.987 1.054 1.022 0.985 1.006 1.005 
TX 1.047 0.922 1.061 1.001 1.035 0.944 1.021 1.003 
UT 1.024 0.955 1.005 1.016 1.016 0.978 1.010 1.000 
VT 0.906 1.054 0.982 1.075 1.028 0.966 1.006 1.001 
VA 0.890 1.041 0.997 1.061 1.012 0.988 1.015 0.999 
WA 0.951 0.979 0.975 1.029 1.027 0.967 1.041 0.995 
WV 0.927 1.034 0.998 1.038 1.012 0.986 0.976 0.995 
WI 0.967 1.009 1.055 0.999 1.083 0.905 1.004 1.002 
WY 0.884 1.063 0.991 1.061 1.021 0.978 1.023 1.001 
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Table A.4 displays the cumulated productivity growth of each state over 2000-2007 
in Model I. Clearly, efficiency change remained stagnant, while technical change was 
driving a productivity growth (decline) over time. This suggests that technological factors 
were crucial for environmental productivity enhancements. 
Table A.4. Model I: State Cumulated Productivity Growth, 2000-2007 
State ML EFFCH TECH 
AL 0.974 1.000 0.974 
AZ 0.987 0.998 0.989 
AR 0.983 1.000 0.983 
CA 0.952 1.000 0.952 
co 1.019 I.ODO 1.019 
CT 1.017 I.ODO 1.017 
DE 1.094 1.000 1.094 
FL 0.978 1.000 0.978 
GA 0.999 1.000 0.999 
ID 0.997 I.ODO 0.997 
IL 0.987 1.000 0.987 
IN 1.000 1.000 1.000 
IA 0.988 1.002 0.986 
KS 0.995 1.000 0.995 
KY 1.008 1.000 1.007 
LA 1.119 1.000 1.119 
ME 1.036 1.000 1.036 
MD 1.009 1.000 1.009 
MA 0.995 I.ODO 0.995 
MI 1.024 I.ODO 1.024 
MN 1.052 I.ODO 1.052 
MS 0.983 1.000 0.983 
MO 0.987 1.000 0.987 
MT 1.062 I.ODO 1.062 
NE 0.988 I.ODO 0.988 
NV 1.045 1.000 1.045 
NH 1.087 1.000 1.087 
NJ 0.976 I.ODO 0.976 
NM 1.142 I.ODO 1.142 
NY 0.980 1.000 0.980 
NC 0.992 1.000 0.992 
ND 0.972 1.000 0.972 
OH 1.013 1.000 1.013 
OK 0.984 1.000 0.984 
OR 0.961 I.ODO 0.961 
PA 1.004 1.000 1.004 
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Table A.4. Continued 
RI 0.909 1.000 0.909 
SC 0.982 l.000 0.983 
SD 1.021 1.000 l.021 
TN 1.032 1.000 1.032 
TX 1.023 1.000 1.023 
UT l.011 1.009 1.002 
VT 1.007 1.000 1.007 
VA 0.994 1.001 0.993 
WA 0.966 1.000 0.966 
WV 0.966 1.000 0.966 
WI 1.012 1.000 1.012 
WY 1.009 1.000 1.009 
GHG was assumed to be strongly disposable in Model 2. The results showed that 
24 states experienced productivity growth, while 21 states experienced productivity decline. 
Delaware showed a larger growth than others. Table A.6 shows that most states also 
experienced stagnant efficiency change in Model 2. In Table A.7, 21 states experienced 
technical regress, while 24 states experienced technical progress. 
Table A.5. State Malmquist-Luenberger Productivity Index in Model 2 
State 00-01 01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 05-06 06-07 Mean 
AL 0.829 1.037 0.924 1.125 0.945 1.022 1.153 0.999 
AZ 0.705 1.045 0.922 1.768 0.913 0.984 0.960 1.005 
AR 0.978 0.912 1.022 1.011 1.072 1.003 0.999 0.999 
CA 0.951 l.002 0.792 1.336 0.989 0.967 na 0.994 
co 0.807 1.086 0.917 1.035 1.086 0.984 1.043 0.989 
CT na 1.031 0.952 0.940 1.025 0.885 na 0.965 
DE 1.225 8.158 0.880 1.121 0.939 0.807 3.695 1.606 
FL 0.885 1.002 1.040 1.471 1.035 0.984 na 1.055 
GA 0.936 1.001 0.960 1.020 1.008 0.961 1.114 0.998 
ID 1.005 1.061 0.969 1.063 0.956 0.982 0.940 0.995 
IL 0.954 l.023 0.910 1.129 1.018 0.979 1.022 1.003 
IN 0.881 0.970 1.010 1.111 1.039 1.010 1.036 1.006 
IA 0.922 l.039 1.010 1.012 1.013 0.964 1.017 0.996 
KS 0.954 1.014 0.966 1.035 1.005 0.959 1.086 1.002 
KY 0.609 1.538 1.027 1.014 1.023 0.987 1.006 0.998 
LA 0.830 1.279 0.484 1.144 1.064 0.956 1.213 0.955 
ME 0.669 l.099 l.008 1.050 1.043 1.010 1.042 0.978 
MD 0.922 0.999 1.023 1.336 0.949 0.913 1.076 1.023 
MA 0.837 1.201 1.024 1.134 0.965 0.977 1.020 1.017 
Ml 0.855 1.092 0.886 1.091 1.067 0.959 1.109 1.003 
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MN 1.029 0.990 1.043 1.072 0.976 0.959 0.978 1.006 
MS 0.670 1.055 0.937 1.088 1.024 1.048 1.080 0.975 
MO 0.827 1.062 0.951 1.099 1.027 1.007 1.052 1.000 
MT 0.746 1.105 0.985 1.146 0.988 1.138 1.007 1.008 
NE 0.945 1.089 0.947 1.036 1.028 1.020 0.956 1.00] 
NV 0.801 na 1.535 9.760 na 0.904 0.980 1.604 
NH na 1.872 0.790 1.086 1.017 0.930 1.633 1.163 
NJ 1.039 0.988 1.045 0.978 0.784 0.971 na 0.963 
NM 0.641 1.151 0.850 1.085 1.121 1.064 1.179 0.994 
NY 0.962 0.995 1.262 1.050 0.963 0.989 1.066 1.037 
NC 0.945 1.015 0.950 1.034 0.999 1.003 1.036 0.997 
ND 0.812 1.015 1.028 1.093 1.008 0.985 1.096 1.00] 
OH 0.849 1.054 0.988 1.089 1.020 0.968 1.061 1.001 
OK 0.798 1.009 1.024 1.066 0.989 1.001 1.160 1.00] 
OR 0.912 0.978 0.911 1.090 1.004 1.120 1.001 I.ODO 
PA 0.856 1.055 0.998 1.022 1.024 0.986 1.061 0.998 
RI 1.112 2.928 0.828 0.988 0.993 0.996 1.006 1.149 
SC 0.983 1.031 0.946 0.976 1.025 0.980 1.060 0.999 
SD 0.862 1.025 1.008 1.121 1.029 1.018 0.975 1.003 
TN 1.009 0.983 0.987 1.06] 0.997 0.995 1.003 1.005 
TX 0.827 0.999 0.958 1.063 1.064 1.006 1.304 1.023 
UT 1.117 0.882 1.018 1.025 1.010 0.866 1.054 0.992 
VT 0.750 0.985 1.039 1.144 1.049 0.966 0.983 0.981 
VA 0.898 1.010 0.975 1.078 0.956 0.938 1.171 1.000 
WA 0.984 1.291 0.896 1.112 0.988 0.991 0.945 1.023 
WV 0.890 0.942 1.003 1.088 1.060 0.974 1.049 0.999 
WI 0.964 1.022 1.064 0.988 1.095 0.892 1.004 1.002 
WY 0.781 0.908 1.027 1.075 1.075 1.042 1.111 0.996 
*na: infeasible solution 
Table A.6. State Efficiency Change Index in Model 2 
State 00-01 01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 05-06 06-07 Mean 
AL 0.925 0.987 0.915 1.052 0.945 1.036 1.163 1.000 
AZ 0.765 1.023 0.902 1.675 0.903 0.995 0.940 1.000 
AR 0.953 0.894 I.ODO 1.020 I. I 07 1.029 1.011 1.000 
CA 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 I.ODO 
co 0.936 1.037 0.922 0.970 1.087 1.026 1.034 1.000 
CT 1.000 1.000 I.ODO 1.000 I.ODO 1.000 1.000 1.000 
DE I.ODO 1.000 1.000 1.000 I.ODO 1.000 1.000 I.ODO 
FL 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
GA 1.067 0.956 0.962 0.942 1.006 0.980 1.096 1.000 
ID 1.124 0.976 0.977 1.007 0.952 0.978 0.995 I.ODO 
IL I.ODO 1.000 0.929 1.066 1.010 1.000 1.000 1.000 
IN 0.998 0.974 0.984 1.034 1.010 1.000 1.000 1.000 
IA 0.969 1.008 1.002 1.008 0.986 1.030 1.000 1.000 
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Table A.6. Continued 
KS 1.065 0.941 0.983 0.962 0.985 0.951 1.127 1.000 
KY 0.875 1.143 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
LA 0.990 1.302 0.712 1.003 1.028 0.952 1.109 1.000 
ME 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
MD 1.038 0.967 0.997 1.020 0.964 0.938 1.084 1.000 
MA 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
MI 0.912 1.031 0.893 1.021 1.068 0.974 1.121 1.000 
MN 1.177 0.923 1.084 0.954 0.958 0.972 0.957 1.000 
MS 0.856 1.025 0.915 1.026 1.039 1.081 1.081 1.000 
MO 0.912 1.007 0.944 1.034 1.031 1.017 1.064 1.000 
MT 0.870 1.002 0.999 1.080 0.953 1.107 1.008 1.000 
NE 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
NV 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
NH 1.000 1.000 0.801 1.017 1.019 0.931 1.295 1.000 
NJ 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
NM 0.877 1.073 0.829 1.023 1.076 1.063 1.096 1.000 
NY 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
NC 1.000 0.983 0.933 0.995 1.017 1.037 1.040 1.000 
ND 0.902 0.938 1.050 1.023 0.977 0.972 1.159 1.000 
OH 0.932 1.025 0.964 1.015 1.030 0.997 1.041 1.000 
OK 0.870 0.989 1.032 1.008 0.972 1.044 I. I 03 1.000 
OR 0.998 0.927 0.906 1.025 1.007 1.127 1.027 1.000 
PA 0.982 1.018 1.000 0.952 1.016 1.009 1.025 1.000 
RI 1.232 0.947 0.835 0.979 1.007 1.008 1.032 1.000 
SC 1.050 1.002 0.920 0.918 1.047 1.010 1.065 1.000 
SD 0.953 0.926 1.032 1.057 0.994 0.961 1.087 1.000 
TN 1.000 1.000 0.973 1.011 1.016 1.000 1.000 1.000 
TX 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
UT 1.135 0.884 1.021 1.035 1.030 0.886 1.038 1.001 
VT 0.955 0.929 1.065 1.065 1.020 1.000 0.975 1.000 
VA 1.024 0.965 0.968 1.004 0.945 0.955 1.155 1.000 
WA 1.104 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.906 1.000 
WV 0.982 0.901 1.024 1.025 1.019 0.983 1.076 1.000 
WI 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
WY 0.916 0.854 1.036 1.013 1.053 1.066 1.086 1.000 
Table A.7. State Technical Change Index in Model 2 
State 00-01 01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 05-06 06-07 Mean 
AL 0.897 1.051 1.011 1.069 1.000 0.986 0.992 0.999 
AZ 0.921 1.022 1.022 1.056 1.010 0.988 1.021 1.005 
AR 1.026 1.020 1.022 0.992 0.969 0.975 0.988 0.999 
CA 0.951 1.002 0.792 1.336 0.989 0.967 na 0.994 
co 0.862 1.047 0.995 1.067 0.999 0.959 1.009 0.989 
CT na 1.031 0.952 0.940 1.025 0.885 na 0.965 
DE 1.225 8.158 0.880 1.121 0.939 0.807 3.695 1.606 
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FL 0.885 1.002 1.040 1.471 1.035 0.984 na 1.055 
GA 0.877 1.048 0.998 1.082 1.002 0.981 1.016 0.999 
ID 0.894 1.087 0.992 1.056 1.004 1.004 0.945 0.995 
IL 0.954 1.023 0.980 1.059 1.008 0.979 1.022 1.003 
IN 0.883 0.996 1.026 1.074 1.029 1.010 1.036 1.006 
IA 0.951 1.030 1.008 1.004 1.028 0.937 1.017 0.996 
KS 0.896 1.078 0.983 1.075 1.020 1.008 0.964 1.002 
KY 0.696 1.346 1.027 1.014 1.023 0.987 1.006 0.998 
LA 0.838 0.982 0.679 1.141 1.035 1.004 1.093 0.955 
ME 0.669 1.099 1.008 1.050 1.043 1.010 1.042 0.978 
MD 0.889 1.033 1.026 1.310 0.984 0.973 0.992 1.023 
MA 0.837 1.201 1.024 1.134 0.965 0.977 1.020 1.017 
MI 0.937 1.058 0.992 1.068 1.000 0.984 0.989 1.003 
MN 0.874 1.073 0.963 1.124 1.019 0.987 1.022 1.006 
MS 0.783 1.029 1.024 1.061 0.985 0.969 0.999 0.975 
MO 0.907 1.054 1.007 1.064 0.996 0.990 0.989 1.000 
MT 0.858 I. I 03 0.986 1.061 1.037 1.028 0.998 1.007 
NE 0.945 1.089 0.947 1.036 1.028 1.020 0.956 1.001 
NV 0.801 na 1.535 9.760 na 0.904 0.980 1.604 
NH na 1.872 0.986 1.068 0.998 1.000 1.261 1.163 
NJ 1.039 0.988 1.045 0.978 0.784 0.971 na 0.963 
NM 0.731 1.073 1.025 1.060 1.042 1.001 1.076 0.994 
NY 0.962 0.995 1.262 1.050 0.963 0.989 1.066 1.037 
NC 0.945 1.033 1.019 1.039 0.982 0.968 0.996 0.997 
ND 0.900 1.083 0.979 1.069 1.032 1.014 0.946 1.001 
OH 0.911 1.028 1.024 1.073 0.990 0.970 1.019 1.001 
OK 0.917 1.021 0.993 1.058 1.018 0.959 1.052 1.001 
OR 0.914 1.056 1.006 1.064 0.997 0.993 0.975 1.000 
PA 0.872 1.036 0.998 1.074 1.008 0.978 1.035 0.998 
RI 0.903 3.091 0.991 1.009 0.986 0.988 0.975 1.149 
SC 0.936 1.029 1.029 1.062 0.980 0.970 0.995 0.999 
SD 0.905 I. I 07 0.977 1.061 1.035 1.059 0.896 1.003 
TN 1.009 0.983 1.015 1.049 0.981 0.995 1.003 1.005 
TX 0.827 0.999 0.958 1.063 1.064 1.006 1.304 1.023 
UT 0.984 0.998 0.997 0.990 0.981 0.977 1.015 0.992 
VT 0.786 1.061 0.976 1.075 1.028 0.966 1.007 0.981 
VA 0.877 1.047 1.007 1.074 1.011 0.983 1.014 1.000 
WA 0.891 1.291 0.896 1.112 0.988 0.991 1.044 1.023 
WV 0.907 1.045 0.980 1.062 1.040 0.992 0.974 0.999 
WI 0.964 1.022 1.064 0.988 1.095 0.892 1.004 1.002 
WY 0.853 1.063 0.991 1.061 1.021 0.978 1.023 0.996 
*na: infeasible solution 
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Table A.8 displays the cumulated productivity growth of each state over the sample 
period in Model 2. Technical change was the major source driving productivity change 
over time. 
Table A.8. Model 2: State Cumulated Productivity Growth, 2000-2007 
State ML EFFCH TECH 
AL 0.995 1.000 0.995 
AZ 1.035 1.000 1.035 
AR 0.990 1.000 0.990 
CA 0.000 1.000 0.000 
co 0.927 1.000 0.927 
CT 0.000 1.000 0.000 
DE 27.593 1.000 27.593 
FL 0.000 1.000 0.000 
GA 0.989 0.998 0.991 
ID 0.968 1.000 0.968 
IL 1.020 1.000 1.020 
IN 1.042 1.000 1.042 
IA 0.972 1.00] 0.971 
KS 1.012 1.000 1.012 
KY 0.989 1.000 0.989 
LA 0.725 1.000 0.725 
ME 0.854 1.000 0.854 
MD 1.172 1.000 1.172 
MA 1.123 1.000 1.123 
MI 1.022 1.000 1.022 
MN 1.043 1.000 1.043 
MS 0.836 1.000 0.836 
MO 0.999 1.000 0.999 
MT 1.054 1.000 1.054 
NE 1.011 1.000 1.011 
NV 0.000 1.000 0.000 
NH 0.000 1.000 0.000 
NJ 0.000 1.000 0.000 
NM 0.956 1.000 0.956 
NY 1.288 1.000 1.288 
NC 0.977 1.000 0.977 
ND 1.009 1.000 1.009 
OH 1.007 1.000 1.007 
OK 1.009 1.000 1.009 
OR 0.998 1.000 0.998 
PA 0.987 1.000 0.987 
RI 2.647 1.000 2.648 
SC 0.995 1.000 0.996 
96 
Table A.8. Continued 
SD 1.021 1.000 1.020 
TN 1.033 1.000 1.033 
TX 1.173 1.000 1.173 
UT 0.948 1.005 0.943 
VT 0.874 1.000 0.874 
VA 1.000 1.001 1.000 
WA 1.171 1.000 1.171 
WV 0.991 1.000 0.991 
WI 1.016 1.000 1.016 
WY 0.974 1.000 0.974 
In Model 3, 18 states experienced an average of 3.5 percent productivity growth 
over the sample period. In this sample, 17 states experienced productivity decline, and the 
average declines in productivity ranged between 0.1 percent and 1.1 percent. The stagnant 
efficiency change was also observed for each state, and the results are shown in Table A. I 0. 
In Table A.11, technical regress was experienced by 19 states, while technical progress was 
experienced by 25 states. Technical change was the main source of productivity change. 
Table A.9. State Malmguist-Luenberger Productivity Index in Model 3 
State 00-01 01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 05-06 06-07 Mean 
AL 0.829 1.037 0.924 1.125 0.945 1.022 1.153 0.999 
AZ 0.705 1.045 0.922 1.730 0.919 0.984 0.960 1.003 
AR 0.978 0.912 1.022 1.011 1.072 1.003 0.999 0.999 
CA 0.933 1.005 0.850 1.244 0.989 0.967 1.053 1.000 
co 0.876 1.072 0.921 1.033 1.087 0.984 1.043 1.000 
CT 0.924 0.999 0.991 1.042 1.040 0.954 1.087 1.004 
DE 0.967 1.141 0.871 1.072 0.966 0.982 1.065 1.006 
FL 0.883 1.017 1.031 0.975 1.036 0.982 1.066 0.997 
GA 0.936 1.001 0.960 1.020 1.008 0.961 1.114 0.998 
ID 1.009 1.053 0.969 1.063 0.956 0.982 0.940 0.995 
IL 0.954 1.022 0.910 1.129 1.018 0.979 1.022 1.003 
IN 0.881 0.970 1.010 1.111 1.039 1.007 1.036 1.006 
IA 0.922 1.039 1.010 1.012 1.013 0.964 1.017 0.996 
KS 0.954 1.014 0.966 1.035 1.005 0.959 1.086 1.002 
KY 0.609 1.627 1.042 1.033 0.994 0.987 1.006 1.007 
LA 0.862 1.081 0.895 1.084 1.044 0.972 1.096 1.001 
ME 0.913 0.992 0.989 1.038 1.029 1.006 1.042 1.000 
MD 0.970 0.999 1.022 1.081 0.953 0.913 1.073 1.000 
MA 0.950 1.036 0.997 1.061 0.980 0.980 1.004 1.000 
MI 0.849 1.084 0.894 1.089 1.068 0.959 1.109 1.002 
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MN 1.026 0.988 1.038 1.054 0.980 0.959 0.978 1.003 
MS 0.803 1.055 0.937 1.088 1.024 1.048 1.074 0.999 
MO 0.829 1.062 0.951 1.099 1.027 1.007 1.052 1.000 
MT 0.788 l.077 0.973 1.111 0.987 1.063 1.014 0.997 
NE 0.945 1.083 0.953 1.032 1.028 l.013 0.956 1.000 
NV 0.858 1.058 1.126 1.007 1.035 0.947 0.996 1.001 
NH 0.830 1.040 0.865 1.079 1.009 0.944 1.290 0.999 
NJ 1.042 1.000 1.027 0.976 0.971 0.969 0.995 0.997 
NM 0.766 1.065 0.929 1.069 1.083 1.029 1.114 1.001 
NY 0.780 1.020 0.973 1.067 1.058 1.156 1.062 1.010 
NC 0.945 1.015 0.950 1.034 0.999 1.003 1.036 0.997 
ND 0.817 1.015 l.028 1.093 1.008 0.985 1.096 1.002 
OH 0.849 1.054 0.988 1.089 1.020 0.968 1.06] 1.001 
OK 0.798 1.009 1.024 l.066 0.989 1.001 1.160 1.00] 
OR 0.912 0.978 0.911 1.090 1.004 1.120 1.00] 1.000 
PA 0.856 1.055 0.998 1.022 1.024 0.986 1.061 0.998 
RI 1.030 1.049 0.872 0.989 0.993 0.995 1.009 0.989 
SC 0.985 1.031 0.946 0.976 1.025 0.980 1.060 0.999 
SD 0.869 1.011 1.012 1.103 1.026 1.015 0.980 1.000 
TN 1.008 0.983 0.987 1.061 0.997 0.995 1.003 1.005 
TX 0.827 0.997 0.994 1.063 1.064 1.009 1.070 1.000 
UT 1.117 0.882 1.018 1.025 1.010 0.866 1.054 0.992 
VT 0.879 0.976 1.039 I. I 05 1.051 0.976 0.984 0.999 
VA 0.907 1.010 0.975 1.078 0.956 0.938 1.158 1.000 
WA 0.965 1.054 0.979 1.076 1.014 0.993 0.953 1.004 
WV 0.893 0.942 1.003 1.088 1.060 0.974 1.049 0.999 
WI 0.967 1.013 1.036 1.003 1.075 0.916 1.002 1.001 
WY 0.812 0.921 1.020 1.072 1.070 1.041 1.097 1.000 
Table A. I 0. State Efficiency Change Index in Model 3 
State 00-01 01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 05-06 06-07 Mean 
AL 0.925 0.987 0.915 1.052 0.945 1.036 1.163 1.000 
AZ 0.765 1.023 0.902 1.659 0.912 0.995 0.940 1.000 
AR 0.953 0.894 1.000 1.020 1.107 1.029 1.011 1.000 
CA 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
co 0.936 1.034 0.923 0.970 1.089 1.026 1.034 1.000 
CT 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.989 1.011 1.000 1.000 1.000 
DE 0.942 1.070 0.871 1.052 0.966 1.019 I. I 00 1.000 
FL 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
GA 1.067 0.956 0.962 0.942 1.006 0.980 1.096 1.000 
ID 1.124 0.976 0.977 1.007 0.952 0.978 0.995 1.000 
IL 1.000 1.000 0.929 1.066 1.010 1.000 1.000 1.000 
IN 0.998 0.974 0.984 1.034 1.010 1.000 1.000 1.000 
IA 0.969 1.008 1.002 1.008 0.986 1.030 1.000 1.000 
KS 1.065 0.941 0.983 0.962 0.985 0.951 1.127 1.000 
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Table A. I 0. Continued 
KY 0.875 1.143 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
LA 0.976 1.011 0.918 0.990 1.029 0.971 1.115 1.000 
ME 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
MD 1.042 0.967 0.994 1.018 0.969 0.938 1.079 1.000 
MA 1.022 1.000 0.983 0.999 0.993 1.00] 1.004 1.000 
Ml 0.912 1.027 0.897 1.021 1.068 0.974 1.121 1.000 
MN 1.169 0.929 1.070 0.959 0.965 0.972 0.957 1.000 
MS 0.862 1.025 0.915 1.026 1.039 1.081 1.073 1.000 
MO 0.912 1.007 0.944 1.034 1.031 1.017 1.064 1.000 
MT 0.863 0.990 1.003 1.038 0.957 1.005 1.170 1.000 
NE 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
NV 0.930 1.014 1.089 0.971 1.030 0.978 0.996 1.000 
NH 0.939 0.973 0.870 1.016 1.007 0.949 1.295 1.000 
NJ 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
NM 0.832 0.970 0.961 1.00] 1.043 1.009 1.226 1.000 
NY 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
NC 1.000 0.983 0.933 0.995 1.017 1.037 1.040 1.000 
ND 0.902 0.938 1.050 1.023 0.977 0.972 1.159 1.000 
OH 0.932 1.025 0.964 1.015 1.030 0.997 1.04] 1.000 
OK 0.870 0.989 1.032 1.008 0.972 1.044 1.103 1.000 
OR 0.998 0.927 0.906 1.025 1.007 1.127 1.027 1.000 
PA 0.982 1.018 1.000 0.952 1.016 1.009 1.025 1.000 
RI 1.141 0.992 0.865 0.980 1.007 1.007 1.028 1.000 
SC 1.050 1.002 0.920 0.918 1.047 1.010 1.065 1.000 
SD 0.938 0.909 1.052 1.030 0.995 0.951 1.144 1.000 
TN 1.000 1.000 0.973 1.011 1.016 1.000 1.000 1.000 
TX 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
UT 1.135 0.884 1.021 1.035 1.030 0.886 1.038 1.00] 
VT 0.955 0.929 1.065 1.039 1.025 0.978 1.017 1.000 
VA 1.025 0.965 0.968 1.004 0.945 0.955 1.153 1.000 
WA 1.080 1.023 0.984 1.005 1.004 1.004 0.908 1.000 
WV 0.982 0.901 1.024 1.025 1.019 0.983 1.076 1.000 
WI 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
WY 0.888 0.881 1.031 1.008 1.053 1.055 I. I 06 1.000 
Table A. I I. State Technical Change Index in Model 3 
State 00-01 01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 05-06 06-07 Mean 
AL 0.897 1.051 1.011 1.069 1.000 0.986 0.992 0.999 
AZ 0.921 1.022 1.022 1.043 1.008 0.988 1.021 1.003 
AR 1.026 1.020 1.022 0.992 0.969 0.975 0.988 0.999 
CA 0.933 1.005 0.850 1.244 0.989 0.967 1.053 1.000 
co 0.937 1.037 0.998 1.065 0.999 0.959 1.009 1.000 
CT 0.924 0.999 0.991 1.053 1.029 0.954 1.087 1.004 
DE 1.027 1.066 1.000 1.020 1.000 0.964 0.968 1.006 
FL 0.883 1.017 1.031 0.975 1.036 0.982 1.066 0.997 
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Table A. I I. Continued 
GA 0.877 1.048 0.998 1.082 1.002 0.981 1.016 0.999 
ID 0.898 1.078 0.992 1.056 1.004 1.004 0.945 0.995 
IL 0.954 1.022 0.980 1.059 1.008 0.979 1.022 1.003 
IN 0.883 0.996 1.026 1.074 1.029 1.007 1.036 1.006 
IA 0.951 1.030 1.008 1.004 1.028 0.937 1.017 0.996 
KS 0.896 1.078 0.983 1.075 1.020 1.008 0.964 1.002 
KY 0.696 1.423 1.042 1.033 0.994 0.987 1.006 0.998 
LA 0.882 1.070 0.975 1.095 1.015 1.001 0.983 0.955 
ME 0.913 0.992 0.989 1.038 1.029 1.006 1.042 0.978 
MD 0.931 1.033 1.028 1.062 0.984 0.973 0.995 1.023 
MA 0.930 1.036 1.014 1.062 0.988 0.979 1.000 1.017 
MI 0.930 1.056 0.997 1.067 1.000 0.984 0.989 1.003 
MN 0.877 1.063 0.970 1.099 1.015 0.987 1.022 1.006 
MS 0.931 1.029 1.024 1.061 0.985 0.969 1.001 0.975 
MO 0.909 1.054 1.007 1.064 0.996 0.990 0.989 1.000 
MT 0.914 1.089 0.970 1.071 1.031 1.058 0.867 1.007 
NE 0.945 1.083 0.953 1.032 1.028 1.013 0.956 1.001 
NV 0.923 1.044 1.033 1.037 1.005 0.969 1.000 1.604 
NH 0.884 1.068 0.995 1.062 1.002 0.996 0.996 1.163 
NJ 1.042 1.000 1.027 0.976 0.971 0.969 0.995 0.963 
NM 0.921 1.099 0.967 1.068 1.038 1.020 0.909 0.994 
NY 0.780 1.020 0.973 1.067 1.058 1.156 1.062 1.037 
NC 0.945 1.033 1.019 1.039 0.982 0.968 0.996 0.997 
ND 0.906 1.083 0.979 1.069 1.032 1.014 0.946 1.001 
OH 0.911 1.028 1.024 1.073 0.990 0.970 1.019 1.001 
OK 0.917 1.021 0.993 1.058 1.018 0.959 1.052 1.001 
OR 0.914 1.056 1.006 1.064 0.997 0.993 0.975 1.000 
PA 0.872 1.036 0.998 1.074 1.008 0.978 1.035 0.998 
RI 0.903 1.057 1.008 1.009 0.986 0.988 0.982 1.149 
SC 0.937 1.029 1.029 1.062 0.980 0.970 0.995 0.999 
SD 0.927 1.113 0.962 1.071 1.031 1.067 0.857 1.003 
TN 1.008 0.983 1.015 1.049 0.981 0.995 1.003 1.005 
TX 0.827 0.997 0.994 1.063 1.064 1.009 1.070 1.023 
UT 0.984 0.998 0.997 0.990 0.981 0.977 1.015 0.992 
VT 0.921 1.051 0.976 1.063 1.025 0.998 0.967 0.981 
VA 0.885 1.047 1.007 1.074 1.011 0.983 1.004 1.000 
WA 0.893 1.031 0.995 1.071 1.010 0.989 1.050 1.023 
WV 0.909 1.045 0.980 1.062 1.040 0.992 0.974 0.999 
WI 0.967 1.013 1.036 1.003 1.075 0.916 1.002 1.002 
WY 0.914 1.045 0.989 1.063 1.016 0.987 0.992 0.996 
Table A.12 displays the cumulated productivity growth of each state over the 
sample period. The results also indicate that technical change was the factor that drove 
productivity growth (decline) over time. 
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Table A.12. Model 3: State Cumulated Productivity Growth, 2000-2007 
State ML EFFCH TECH 
AL 0.995 1.000 0.995 
AZ 1.020 1.000 1.020 
AR 0.990 1.000 0.990 
CA 0.999 1.000 0.999 
co 0.997 1.000 0.998 
CT 1.027 1.000 1.027 
DE 1.041 1.000 1.041 
FL 0.978 1.000 0.978 
GA 0.989 0.998 0.991 
ID 0.966 1.000 0.965 
IL 1.019 1.000 1.019 
IN 1.039 1.000 1.039 
IA 0.972 1.001 0.971 
KS 1.012 1.000 1.012 
KY 1.051 1.000 1.051 
LA 1.005 1.000 1.005 
ME 1.002 1.000 1.002 
MD 0.998 1.000 0.998 
MA 1.003 1.000 1.004 
MI 1.017 1.000 1.017 
MN 1.018 1.000 1.018 
MS 0.996 1.000 0.996 
MO 1.001 1.000 1.001 
MT 0.976 1.000 0.976 
NE 1.001 1.000 1.001 
NV 1.004 1.000 1.004 
NH 0.991 1.000 0.991 
NJ 0.978 1.000 0.978 
NM 1.005 1.000 1.005 
NY 1.071 1.000 1.071 
NC 0.977 1.000 0.977 
ND 1.014 1.000 1.015 
OH 1.007 1.000 1.007 
OK 1.009 1.000 1.009 
OR 0.998 1.000 0.998 
PA 0.987 1.000 0.987 
RI 0.928 1.000 0.928 
SC 0.996 1.000 0.996 
SD 1.00] 1.000 1.001 
TN 1.032 1.000 1.032 
TX 1.000 1.000 1.000 
UT 0.948 1.005 0.943 
VT 0.994 1.000 0.994 
VA 0.999 1.000 0.999 
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Table A.12. Continued 
WA 1.028 1.000 1.028 
WV 0.994 1.000 0.994 
WI 1.005 1.000 1.005 
WY 0.999 1.000 0.999 
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APPENDIXB 
l applied three models to measure efficiency and productivity change in trucking in 
2002 and 2005 accounting for both GHG emissions and toxic air pollutants. Table B.1 
presents the descriptive statistics of the inefficiency scores obtained in Models (I)- (3). 
Trucking inefficiency decreased in Model I, but increased in Model 2 and 3. In 
Model I, the average inefficiency scores were 0.007 in 2002 and 0.005 in 2005; this means 
that under the assumption of weak disposability ofGHG and toxic air pollutants, states 
could expand good output and contract GHG and toxic air pollutants by an average of0.7 
percent and 0.5 percent in 2002 and 2005, respectively. Since the technology set was 
largest in Model 3, the inefficiency scores in Model 3 were higher. 
Table B. l. Average Inefficiency Scores in 2002 and 2005 
2002 2005 
Model I 
Mean 0.007 0.005 
SD 0.012 0.009 
Min 0.000 0.000 
Max 0.051 0.032 
Model 2 
Mean 0.030 0.039 
SD 0.034 0.028 
Min 0.000 0.000 
Max 0.134 0.107 
Model 3 
Mean 0.037 0.039 
SD 0.031 0.027 
Min 0.000 0.000 
Max 0.134 0.107 
Table B.2 presents the average technical inefficiency scores by state in 2002 and 
2005. Different rankings of states' performances were found in the three models. The five 
least efricient states in Model I were Wyoming, New Mexico, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, 
and North Dakota, while the five least efficient states in Model 2 are Nevada, Wyoming, 
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Texas, Indiana, and New Mexico, and the most inefficient states were Nevada, Wyoming, 
Texas, Oregon, and Indiana in Model 3. 
Table B.2. Average Annual Inefficiency Scores by State in 2002 and 2005 
State Model I Model 2 Model 3 
AL 0.008 0.048 0.048 
AZ 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CA 0.000 0.041 0.041 
co 0.000 0.000 0.021 
CT 0.013 0.032 0.032 
DE 0.000 0.037 0.037 
FL 0.000 0.034 0.034 
GA 0.000 0.027 0.031 
ID 0.000 0.014 0.047 
IL 0.000 0.018 0.026 
IN 0.013 0.054 0.054 
IA 0.000 0.022 0.027 
KS 0.010 0.044 0.046 
KY 0.011 0.046 0.046 
LA 0.004 0.034 0.037 
ME 0.000 0.022 0.042 
MD 0.000 0.041 0.041 
MA 0.000 0.037 0.039 
MI 0.000 0.018 0.018 
MN 0.015 0.046 0.046 
MS 0.002 0.042 0.042 
MO 0.016 0.046 0.046 
MT 0.016 0.038 0.038 
NE 0.014 0.031 0.032 
NV 0.000 0.067 0.067 
NH 0.000 0.000 0.021 
NJ 0.000 0.034 0.034 
NM 0.020 0.054 0.054 
NY 0.000 0.028 0.030 
NC 0.009 0.039 0.048 
ND 0.017 0.044 0.044 
OH 0.017 0.036 0.036 
OK 0.012 0.027 0.027 
OR 0.000 0.053 0.054 
PA 0.018 0.046 0.046 
RI 0.000 0.053 0.053 
SC 0.002 0.019 0.019 
SD 0.009 0.033 0.033 
TN 0.000 0.048 0.048 
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Table B.2. Continued 
TX 0.000 0.056 0.056 
UT 0.000 0.045 0.045 
VT 0.000 0.000 0.026 
VA 0.000 0.024 0.049 
WA 0.000 0.051 0.051 
WV 0.000 0.014 0.014 
WI 0.018 0.046 0.046 
WY 0.026 0.061 0.061 
Mean 0.006 0.034 0.038 
Table B.3 presents the geometric mean of the Malmquist-Luenberger (ML) index 
and its technical change (TECH) and efficiency change (TECH) components in 2002 and 
2005. Productivity change and its components were different in three models. In Model I, 
an average productivity decline, technology regress and efficiency improvement were 
observed in 2002-2005, while a productivity growth, technology progress and efficiency 
decline were observed in Model 2 and Model 3. 
Table B.3 Mean Productivity Chan e and Decom osition in 2002-2005 
Model I Model2 Model 3 
Year ML EFFCH TECH ML EFFCH TECH ML EFFCH TECH 
02-05 0.956 1.002 0.954 1.129 0.991 1.148 I. I 04 0.997 I. I 07 
Table B.4 represents the productivity growth and it decompositions by state. An 
average productivity decline, technical regress, and efficiency improvement were observed 
in Model l, which assumes weak disposability for GHG and toxic air pollutants. On the 
contrary, a productivity growth, technical progress and efficiency decline were observed in 
Model 2, which assumes strong disposability for GHG and toxic air pollutants, and Model 
3, which ignores GHG and toxic air pollutants. Furthermore, 37 states experienced 
productivity decline, and eight states had productivity growth in Model I, and technical 
change was the main source of productivity change. In addition, productivity change and 
its components varied in different states. 
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Table B.4. Productivity Change and Decompositions by State in 2002-2005 
I Model I I Model 2 I Model3 
State ML EFFCH TECH ML EFFCH TECH ML EFFCH TECH 
AL 0.958 0.984 0.974 1.068 0.945 1.130 1.042 0.945 I. I 02 
AZ 0.654 1.000 0.654 1.333 1.000 1.333 1.092 1.000 1.092 
AR 0.817 1.000 0.817 0.969 1.000 0.969 1.145 1.000 1.145 
CA na 1.000 na 1.176 0.984 1.195 1.078 0.984 1.096 
co 0.971 1.000 0.971 1.232 1.000 1.232 1.286 1.043 1.233 
CT 0.891 0.975 0.914 1.064 0.940 1.132 1.023 0.940 1.089 
DE 0.776 1.000 0.776 0.852 0.931 0.915 0.897 0.931 0.964 
FL 0.919 1.000 0.919 1.233 0.936 1.317 1.025 0.936 1.095 
GA 0.973 1.000 0.973 1.169 0.953 1.227 1.062 0.960 1.107 
ID 1.077 1.000 1.077 1.095 0.973 1.125 1.123 1.038 1.082 
IL 0.977 1.000 0.977 1.241 1.036 1.198 1.122 1.018 1.103 
IN 0.984 1.025 0.960 na 1.033 na 1.126 1.033 1.090 
IA 1.002 1.000 1.002 1.063 0.959 I. I 09 1.087 0.968 1.123 
KS 0.948 0.980 0.967 1.042 0.933 1.116 1.024 0.938 1.092 
KY 0.971 1.023 0.949 na 1.030 na 1.123 1.030 1.090 
LA 0.966 0.993 0.974 na 0.977 na 1.072 0.983 1.090 
ME 1.041 1.000 1.041 1.120 0.958 1.169 1.092 0.997 1.095 
MD na 1.000 na 1.212 0.935 1.297 1.029 0.934 I. I 02 
MA 0.948 1.000 0.948 1.054 0.931 1.132 1.028 0.934 1.100 
MI 0.978 1.000 0.978 na 1.036 na 1.195 1.036 1.154 
MN 0.961 0.998 0.963 1.178 1.023 1.151 1.119 1.023 1.094 
MS 0.966 0.996 0.970 1.114 0.994 1.120 I. I 00 0.994 I. I 06 
MO 0.988 1.013 0.975 na 1.008 na 1.105 1.008 1.097 
MT 0.922 0.969 0.951 1.076 0.929 1.159 1.027 0.929 1.106 
NE 0.940 0.973 0.966 1.058 0.946 1.118 1.046 0.948 I. I 03 
NV na 1.000 na 1.911 1.134 1.686 1.258 1.134 1.110 
NH 0.995 1.000 0.995 1.332 1.000 1.332 1.173 1.042 1.126 
NJ 0.924 1.000 0.924 0.885 0.937 0.945 1.031 0.937 I. I 01 
NM 0.999 1.039 0.962 na 1.049 na 1.152 1.049 1.098 
NY 0.947 1.000 0.947 1.072 0.952 1.126 1.049 0.957 1.097 
NC 0.979 0.982 0.997 1.076 0.927 1.160 1.040 0.944 I. I 01 
ND 0.971 1.015 0.957 na 1.031 na 1.127 1.031 1.092 
OH 0.981 1.006 0.976 1.145 1.018 1.125 1.115 1.018 1.095 
OK 0.989 1.023 0.967 1.178 1.054 1.118 1.154 1.054 1.095 
OR 0.903 1.000 0.903 1.135 0.993 1.143 1.090 0.995 1.095 
PA 0.973 1.001 0.972 1.126 0.992 1.134 1.089 0.992 1.097 
RI 0.903 1.000 0.903 0.994 0.904 1.100 0.983 0.904 1.088 
SC 1.042 1.004 1.037 1.572 1.039 1.513 1.590 1.039 1.530 
SD 0.980 1.018 0.963 na 1.026 na 1.122 1.026 1.093 
TN 0.970 1.000 0.970 1.117 0.994 1.124 1.092 0.994 1.098 
TX 0.937 1.000 0.937 na 1.035 na 1.137 1.035 1.099 
UT 1.150 1.000 1.150 1.213 1.028 1.180 1.128 1.028 1.097 
VT 0.907 1.000 0.907 1.308 1.000 1.308 1.148 1.051 1.092 
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VA 1.036 1.000 1.036 1.137 0.954 1.19] 1.098 1.002 1.096 
WA 0.974 1.000 0.974 1.178 1.018 1.157 1.112 1.018 1.092 
WV 0.923 1.000 0.923 0.530 0.974 0.544 1.078 0.974 I. I 08 
WI 1.014 1.026 0.988 1.152 1.035 1.113 1.126 1.035 1.088 
WY 1.035 1.051 0.985 1.330 1.122 1.186 1.233 1.122 1.099 
Mean 0.959 1.002 0.957 1.147 0.992 1.162 1.108 0.999 I. I 09 
*na: infeasible solution 
An ANOVA F-test and a series of nonparametric tests were applied to examine 
productivity index variations between Model I and Model 2. The statistical results are 
presented in Table 8.5. The results show that the productivity indexes in Model I and 
Model 2 were statistically significantly different. 
Table B.5. ANOV AF-test and Nonparametric Tests 
ANOVA-F Kruskal-Wallis Median 
Year (Prob > F) (Prob > x2) (Prob > x2) 
02-05 32.811 37.968 39.773 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
107 
Van der Waerden 
(Prob> x2) 
31.628 
(0.000) 
Savage 
(Prob> x2) 
32.943 
(0.000) 
